Thank you. I want to ruminate on this further.

I don't want to minimize the issue you are raising here, but I also do not have the time or psychic energy to research it properly at this time. Remember, I am no longer on a faculty.

So, allow me to give you a tentative response, but I ask you not to take it as if I intended to be definitive. There is a lot to metaphysics that takes careful reflection.

It seems to me that Fabro is onto something when he says: "Both groups, according to him, erroneously think that esse as act is grasped in a judgment. They do not see that judgment grasps merely the fact of existing."

Existence is said to be known in a judgment, but I agree that it is primarily an affirmation of the reality of a being, not the act of existence itself that the mind grasps.

But this does not mean that the concept of being is merely a "fact," like some merely logical entity. For it is clear that once formed, the concept of being is held absolutely firmly and serves as a basis for the attendant insights expressed in metaphysical first principles.

Perhaps the all too obvious distinction between being (ens) as meaning the whole being (essentia et existentia), on the one hand, and being as act of existence (actus essendi), on the other hand, is relevant here.

I think the concept of being is best expressed as the former. I agree that we do not have a proper concept of esse as such, but only in relation to the total being from which we form the concept of being (ens).

Nonetheless, Maritain in his Preface to Metaphysics, 87, writes:
"We shall thus understand that the being of metaphysics, the highest and most hidden thing in the natural order, is concealed in the being of common sense. Nothing is more ordinary than being, if we mean the being of everyday knowledge, nothing more hidden, if we mean the being of metaphysics."

He speaks of how the mind strips away the physical and material properties of being as encountered in sense experience, so as to raise one's grasp of the intuition of being itself, even though first cast in material and mathematical cloaking.

What I am trying to avoid here is any suggestion that, since we do not know the esse of a being directly, therefore we cannot form a concept of being that is metaphysically rich and useful -- since clearly the mind does grasp in the concept of being, the certitude and richness of the universal first principles.

The mere fact that scholars need to speak more precisely about exactly how the intellect handles the elements of being should not allow us to lose the realization that the human mind does, in fact and in truth, attain some immediately know first principles simply by its first encounters with the things of experience.

Once the mind has encountered any being, it forms an initial concept of being that will hold good for all possible beings. Since that knowledge is not restricted to some limited essence, like chicken-ness, it will apply to anything that can possibly be or exist.... Moreover, while something new might express some essence never before encountered, if it exists, it still is a being. And the mind has already encountered being from which it has formed a concept that applies to any being whatever.

Dennis, the bolded phrases above are in line with what I was trying to get at a few days ago with my question about a distinction between esse as 'act' and existence in the sense of the fact of being. John Wipple says that there is a distinction in Aquinas between esse as "facticity" and esse as "intrinsic actus essendi." As I wrote then, Kevin White summarizes certain modern Thomists as saying that "our intellect directly comprehends only essence; it does not reach the existence that enters into an essence. Existence cannot be defined by us, not only because of its maximum generality or logical transcendence, but also because, of its nature, it has no distinctive way (modo proprio) of presenting itself to our intellect outside of the essence of which it is act."

I am wondering what you think of this claim of the hiddenness, so to speak, of something's act of existence, and if that act is hidden from us, does such hiddenness qualify what you say in passages like that which I quoted from your article?

I am not sure whether these exegetes aren't just gussying up Thomas' well-known distinction of two senses of esse, sc. as copulative and as act of being, or whether they are pointing to some further distinction in the senses of esse.

I am not quite certain of the point you are explaining. But, you cannot ever make anyone see the force of an argument. You can only present it and hope his own mind will grasp its truth. That is why the First Vatican Council defined that the existence of God can be known by natural reason, and did not say "can be demonstrated" by natural reason. To "demonstrate" is to show to another -- and for whatever subjective reasons may obtain, that other person may fail to grasp the force of the argument. But God's existence can be known simply points out that such a demonstration can be known to the mind -- assuming there is no such impediment.
Just because I do not grasp the force of a proof you offer to me does not mean the proof itself if faulty.

How would you counter which most atheists use to the tag argument. "The problem is they they're just asserting that they have the solution, not demonstrating it. Tell his that he has to show how god is the necessary solution, and not merely a sufficient one."

Hmm... Doesn't space, the overwhelming vast majority of reality, often referred to as nothing, both "be" and "not be"?

There's "something" between the Earth and Moon, or they would be one. But this "something" has none of the properties we use to define "somethings" such as weight, mass, form, color, shape etc.

Isn't most of reality somehow outside of human generated dualistic concepts such as "be vs. not be" and "exists vs. not exists"?

I'm sure I don't yet fully understand your article, and so perhaps you can explain whether what I've asked is relevant?

Here is a counter argument. Why do transcendentals need a justification or foundation ie God.

The author of the article seems to be saying that the fact (or rather, the truth) that PNC is certain constitutes a kind of proof of PNC: It is certain therefore it is true.

But PNC is not true because it is certain; rather, it is certain because it is true.

PNC is certain, but that does not make it certain to us. It is true that PNC cannot be denied (or doubted) without self-contradiction. But the falsity of PNC is thinkable.

Logicians affirm that if PNC is false (i.e. that true contradictions exist) all affirmations are both provably true and provably false (the Principle of Explosion).

Provability is then universal.

That is the thesis of Rationalism. And Rationalism is a thinkable position. The Magisterium of the Catholic Church rejected Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century. But it didn't prove that Rationalism (i.e. that everything is subject to proof) is wrong.

Then how can we say that PNC is certain? There you have a good question!

St. Thomas that God's existence is self-evident, certain and true but without being self-evident to us. St. Thomas affirms that God's existence can be demonstrated; but it it were self-evident it could not be demonstrated, for demonstration would not be possible.

PNC (as metaphysical principle) must coincide with the being (esse) of God. Otherwise one would create an absurd multiplicity of self evident certain truths. When St. Thomas says that God's existence is self-evident he is saying that it is not subject to proof, because that which is self-evident is not subject to proof.

But wait! Does St. Thomas not teach that God's existence can be proved?

Here we run into the difficulty of language, but not a contradiction in St. Thomas. One can prove THAT God exists, but to prove that God's exists is NOT to prove God's esse, his very existence, which is self-evident and certain.

God is a Mystery. He is Mystery with a Capital Letter.

If empirical truths fall under PNC, empirical truths are demonstrable under PNC. This is why scientists affirm that empirical truths have the same certainty as mathematical truths. Science has faith in empirical truth. But the philosopher is free to ask the scientist why he has such faith. That is a good question.

Oh, that was poor wording on my part. As per usual, you're correct. I should have said that every contingent thing has a cause.