Since the omnibenevolent God has given man his rational
nature and last end, God’s own fidelity assures man that proper use of that
rational nature will enable us to attain our last end, which is eternal union
with the Supreme Good, which is God himself.

We don't need to attain eternal union with God, because there is no other place we have ever been or ever could be. This may be expressed in the Catholic doctrine that God is ever present in all times and places. This is what omnibenevolent really means.

What we may wish to attain, to the limited degree it is possible for us in our very short little lives, is some relief from the illusion that we are separate from God.

This illusion of division is generated by the nature of thought, that which we are made of psychologically. This is an important insight because identifying the source of the illusion provides some limited ability to manage that source, and thus the illusion, and thus the pain which flows from the illusion.

The genius at the heart of Catholicism is the advice to love. Love is an act of surrender of the primary product of division generated by thought, the "me".

In the East they often approach the problem from a different angle by various methods of reducing the overall volume of thought, that which is the source of the illusion. Same problem, same solution, just in a somewhat different form.

All the great religions address this fundamental issue of the illusion of division. All that separates them are a seemingly infinitely complex web of cultural differences layered on top.

Just a brief question here. Natural law ethics seem quite accurate to me, but I've heard some skeptics argue that, according to natural law ethics, using a standard barrier-method condom is no different from chewing natural rubber; both ignore the natural end of the respective body parts they interact with for some other pleasure. Clearly, however, these acts are not equally morally grave- and hence, so say the skeptics, natural law falls apart. Shaving could also be another instance the skeptic could bring up, seeing as it seemingly violates the natural end of hair, which is to grow.

What is the distinction between these cases?

EDIT: I have a second question that I'm going to tack on: how would you respond to this often-mentioned problem with hylomorphism? "If human bodies are not bodies when they are not ensouled, and if the souls of bodies are, as Aristotle claims, their forms, then human bodies are not amenable to a hylomorphic treatment. The application of a general hylomorphic framework to the case of the soul and body does not even seem possible. Matter, according to hylomorphism, is contingently enformed; so, bodies, treated by Aristotle as matter, should also be contingently enformed. If, however, bodies are only homonymously bodies when they have lost their souls, then bodies are necessarily enformed: bodies are necessarily actually alive. So, human bodies are both contingently and necessarily enformed. That seems an unhappy and rather immediate consequence. In fact, Aristotle seems to have contradicted himself."

I definitely believe in a sort of Thomistic hylomorphism, but I'm not sure of how the specifics work here! Here's the link, if you need more context. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-psychology/suppl1.html

I don't think I disagree with anything you've said except I'm pretty sure moral judgements are largely social in nature. We develop our morals in part based on the the morals of the society that surrounds us an people share and expect other people to share morals in common.

The supposed is/ought problem is often used as an argument for the existence of immaterial, or the necessity of god as a moral source.

Such arguments come in various forms, but in general they seek to show that ought cannot come from the purely material, therefore the immaterial and god must necessarily be the case.

By recognizing that ought is simply an individual emotion, which is brain function, which is the process of material it can be seen that any supposed is/ought problem lends no weight whatsoever, much less prove the necessity of immaterial or god.

Oy.

First, when you say "natural body = cosmos" I think you mean "cosmos instanceof natural body." The two aren't equal, and one of them is an abstraction.

Secondly, you're equivocating on the term nature. When describing nature (the cosmos; that which exists spatio-temporally, is present by extension, and involves matter and/or energy) one should expect it to behave naturalistically in two senses: (1.) according to its nature, whatever its nature is; and (2.) according to the nature of Nature, because nature is what it is. But when something is supernatural in the material sense (e.g. an angel, Zeus, an efrit, a jinn, one of the shee, or what-have-you), but nevertheless has some kind of nature (second sense) intrinsic to itself, one would expect it to behave in accord with that nature. But a person who claims that an angel exercises powers in accord with its nature (second sense) is not at all revealing his philosophical Naturalism (first sense).

And what, precisely, is meant by "vulcanisation?" Is that in the Mr. Spock sense, the Igneous Rock sense, or the rubber-tough-enough-for-auto-tires sense?

Philip Rand,

1. "pertains to the order of reason" !== cognitive (for those disinclined to use JavaScript and similar languages, the operator !== is pronounced "is not exactly equal to"), so your first premise is underdetermined to permit your conclusions to follow from the combining of your first premise with the others;

2. "automatically dictates how the creature exists and operates" is intended as a generalization; applied to moral agents (rational beings able to deliberate between goods) it becomes a desideratum for flourishing, rather than a statement of fact.

3. It also doesn't appear you're using a consistent definition of the term free will; or else, that your usage is different from that of the Thomist in such a way as to make your objection have no force. I can't be sure which because you don't sufficiently clarify your usage.

4. "However, stopping at a red traffic light is NOT based on reason at all, it is based on a perception." This is like saying that a basketball "is not round at all; it's orange with black lines." Changes (like a foot pressing on a brake pedal) can have more than one cause at the same time, especially when those causes are of different kinds. Not that this distinction matters given the earlier problems with your objection; but I felt I should point out that to say that stopping at a traffic light can't possibly be a reasonable choice if there are any perceptions involved is trivially false. (If you meant something else, you'd better clarify what that was. Philosophers need to learn how to get outside of their own heads to communicate their thoughts to others.)

5. The traffic light analogy demonstrates no contradiction in Natural Law Ethics; indeed, it doesn't appear you've argued for one even if your premises had been true and your uses of terms non-equivocal. You've asserted that there's a contradiction, but not stated what it is.

I can't say for sure that your post is mere word-salad; there might be an actual argument which you were not quite managing to sufficiently explain. But, at bare minimum, more explanation is required.

Let me respond point by point:

Number Two: You say people with "informed consciences." Clearly if they reach contradictory conclusions, at least one side is not properly informed.

They must follow their consciences. Conscience is not infallible. it can be dead wrong. That is why it must be properly informed. This is a matter of discovering the objectively true good moral course of action.

Number Three: It certainly sounds like the experts made the wrong call about parenting children.

Let's be clear about how this works. The general principle that parents must do the right thing for their children is true. They must do what love dictates for their children.

What IS the right thing to do in a given circumstance is a matter of prudential judgment. Some people have little prudence. Clearly, making this judgment entailed using the available science and medicine of the times. We today would say it was dead wrong. That can always happen when making a prudential judgment

But do not make the mistake of confusing prudential judgments with situation ethics. One must apply universally true principles to concrete circumstances. In this instance, one must do what is right for the children, but knowing what is right is subject to error and appears to have been ill-informed at the time.

Do NOT let that make you think that something like abortion might fit the circumstances at times -- for abortion entails an intrinsically evil act which can never be justified by the circumstances. That is why prudential judgments must first conform to universal ethical principles.

Number Four: You are asking me to speculate as a theologian. I am not a theologian. I am a philosopher. Put your question to a theologian.

Edit: " Has god taught humanity everything about natural law or is there more to come?"

This is a proper philosophical question I should answer.

Since the natural law is intrinsic to the nature of creatures, it has already been promulgated fully. The understanding by man of the implications of his own nature may bear further development, but in principle the presence of human nature was complete in the appearance of man, and thus, no further natural data is needed. Further challenges may arise through scientific and medical discoveries that may lead to new questions, as in bioethics, but the basic principles for their solution are already present in the essential permanence of human nature.

Yes, in the sense that my material brain functions are responsible for my subjective value judgements you can reason from an objective 'is' (my brain functions) to a subjective 'ought'. However, this is not what people usually mean by deriving an 'ought' from an 'is' .

Yes, you can convert the subjective statement, "Apples are tasty," to the equivalent objective statement "I find apples tasty," but this does not mean that apples are now objectively tasty.

Hi Dennis,
You wrote:

But while all men know the most general natural law principle of to do good and avoid evil, knowledge of the moral status of particular acts, such as adultery, abortion, divorce, plagiarism, paying taxes, and so forth, is subject to the caprice of extensive human ignorance.

1) Most people I would agree have a general intuition about moral decision making but I think we may disagree about its origins.

2) In any case, that's not the question I asked you to answer, though. I don't want to know what ignorant capricious people think. I am asking what is to be done when reasonable folks with good intentions and informed consciences find themselves at polar opposites on a particular moral issue?

3) In my parenting example, did scientists/doctors in the late 1900s misinterpret human nature and make the wrong call about withholding affection from children? Please answer yes or no. I don't mind if you add qualifiers, but please start with a simple yes or no.

This is why, while there is an objective science of ethics, of which some have far better understanding than others, there is need for divine revelation to guide human beings in such important matters, for example, something like the Ten Commandments or the Catholic Magisterium.

4) Do you think God stopped revealing himself to us after the biblical period? Where is the revelation today? Is it just encapsulated by the magisterium? Has god taught humanity everything about natural law or is there more to come? (I don't mean "more to come in the after life." I mean "more to come in the history of humanity in THIS world." And I also don't mean personal revelation but rather revelation writ large.