Thank you very much, Jim and Rob, for your kind words. They are much appreciated.

Hello Luke,

You have put significant thought in answering my questions, of course I will answer yours.

You don't have to answer, but I'm curious: do you simply reject the analogy

I do reject the analogy, because I do not think that they are analogous. An inexplicable thing is just that -- inexplicable. It has no bearing on what the nature of the thing may be, it is rather the state of not knowing the answer of what that nature is. Gratuitous evil is evil with no value or benefit. It is a possible explanation which may describe part of the nature of a particular event. Therefore, (A) is a statement about our ability to understand something. (B) is a statement about the ultimate nature of something we might understand. They are in different categories. An act of gratuitous evil may be inexplicable to us: we do not recognize, for example, the harm done or see apparent value where there is none. Redeemed evil may be inexplicable, where the harm is seen but any real value is missed. In the first example, it is both (A) and (B), while in the second, it is only (A), because (A) has little to no bearing on whether (B) applies.

To declare an absence of belief in a Creator is to declare belief in naturalism as the source and origin of reality.

Although a reasonable hypothesis, there is no evidence that naturalism is the source and origin of reality. To believe in it involves a position of faith. Therefore to declare an absence of belief in a Creator is a position of faith.

You don't have to answer, but I'm curious: do you simply reject the analogy between:

     (A) inexplicable thing in science
     (B) gratuitous evil

? It seems to me that if we can be justified in thinking that (A) will be overturned, we can use similar justification to say that (B) will be overturned. The asymmetries in 1)–6) which allow (A) to be overturned seem to symmetrically apply to allowing (B) to be overturned.

Hello Luke,

It is clear from this answer that we are understanding this issue in very different ways, and the conflict I see is not one that you see. I am not sure how to link our perspectives on this issue. However, your response has answered my initial question. One cannot have input on how to address a conflict that one does not see as being present. Therefore, I think it is best to thank you for your time and thoughts, and end the conversation here.

III. There are evils which have been redeemed. They will never have those redeeming qualities prove transient or without value.

Ok? The probabilistic version of this claim is made about scientific knowledge; it must be claimed in order for a body of knowledge to be continually accumulated.

In support of this, there are cases where apparent good coming out of tragedy does not last (e.g., positive change in those involved that only lasts a short period before they return to prior negative behaviors and thinking, which is not uncommon).

Sure. Scientists also sometimes think they've figured something out when in actuality, they haven't. But this doesn't pose a problem for arguing that scientific knowledge really does accumulate. The reason is that you don't have to be perfectly right every single time; it merely has to be that on average, the boundaries of knowledge are expanded. It might take several scientists, perhaps even several generations, to figure something out.

In such cases, it is plausible to say that the ultimate, true understanding of the phenomena will be that it had no net redemptive qualities. There is nothing in the argument guaranteeing that evil must resolve in a redemptive way.

Sure, and it is possible there are empirical aspects of reality which are permanently impenetrable to us humans. This is why I brought up new mysterianism. This is why I said:

LB: This is a metaphysical position: even though appearances point toward irrationality, the belief is that one can drill below them to bedrock.

I never argued that we can know, with perfect confidence, that every evil is guaranteed to be redeemed. Instead, I argued that the idea that we can be highly confident that there are gratuitous evils is iffy, at least for those who reject new mysterianism and other tokens of its type. I argued that we must take an attitude opposite of these people—

In 1590, skeptics still doubted whether humans can find universal regularities in nature; by 1640, nature was in irremediable decay: but, by 1700, the changeover to the "law-governed" picture of a stable cosmos was complete. (Cosmopolis, 110)

—in the moral domain, on pain of never finding order that is actually there. Now, surely there are possible worlds where those 1590 skeptics are correct, worlds where science was impossible (perhaps due to the brain being unable of sophisticated abstract reasoning). But I am also confident that had everyone believed those skeptics in our world, they would have appeared to be correct. Only those willing to disbelieve them and wager heavily on that disbelief were in a position to overturn their truth-claims.

Hello Luke,

One can do the same with II. I am saying that the same logic can then extend to rejecting other claims necessary to defend against the problem of evil in this fashion. I will offer one below:

Compare:

I. There are empirical phenomena we cannot explain. We will never be able to explain them.
II. There are evils which have not been redeemed. They will never be redeemed.

III. There are evils which have been redeemed. They will never have those redeeming qualities prove transient or without value.

In III., one can use the same logic to challenge claims that apparently non-gratuitous evil is, in fact, non-gratuitous. In support of this, there are cases where apparent good coming out of tragedy does not last (e.g., positive change in those involved that only lasts a short period before they return to prior negative behaviors and thinking, which is not uncommon). In such cases, it is plausible to say that the ultimate, true understanding of the phenomena will be that it had no net redemptive qualities. There is nothing in the argument guaranteeing that evil must resolve in a redemptive way.

I like your synopsis, I suppose you are referring to "blind" faith. The difficulty is going deep into the details to show that the tenets of our faith do not contradict reason. Unfortunately the internet is full of sophistry, every declaration given equal weight, Wikipedia is the most prevalent example.
I'm not sure I understand your last sentence though, that he is switching one faith for another. It seems more like such a person is switching faith and reason for reason alone.

I have made a case that holding 1) - 6) as though they are valid responses to the evidential problem of evil logically supports A) - C) being symmetrical, not asymmetrical.

But how does that argument work, and why doesn't it work against the claim that we are accumulating empirical knowledge? Compare:

I. There are empirical phenomena we cannot explain. We will never be able to explain them.
II. There are evils which have not been redeemed. They will never be redeemed.

The way one rejects I. is via asserting an asymmetry of A.–C. and appealing to continual progress in understanding more and more empirical phenomena. Why can one not do the same with II.?

The reason I stopped before 7) is the A.–C. asymmetry I claim exists.

My point has really been that 1) - 6) logically supports a lack of asymmetry. I understand you are claiming the asymmetry exists. I agree it exists. I do not believe that 1) - 6) are valid challenges to moral judgements. I have made a case that holding 1) - 6) as though they are valid responses to the evidential problem of evil logically supports A) - C) being symmetrical, not asymmetrical. I am suggesting that you used aspects of 1) - 6) to respond to apparently gratuitous evil and the problem of evil in your original post, but that 1) - 6), taken to their logical conclusions, can be equally challenging to any evidence that could support a belief in a specifically good God, and so actually also supports a different form of the problem of evil in the process of trying to address it.

Your skepticism about rationality in the moral/​ethical domain

Please re-read my last post. I specifically stated I am not skeptical in this domain. I am highlighting how 1) - 6) do support such skepticism, and why this is problematic in using them as an answer to apparently gratuitous evil and the evidential problem of evil in general.