I actually do think that moral standards are subject to change -- I have witnessed people alter and modify their moral understanding quite often, and seen similar shifts at larger societal levels. I do find it interesting that you seem to believe that morality must have a perfect standard to compare to in order to be meaningful, and I see no reason this must be true. People across differing religious and cultural perspectives can seek to form a "true" standard of morality with equal earnestness, yet come to sometimes strikingly different conclusions. This in contrast to objectively distinct objects and natural features, where a consensus is far more likely as the subject is examined and grasped. The best objective standard I might propose for morality is that it involves behavior that best promotes its apparent purpose -- building stronger social bonds and society.

Regarding requiring an objective standard, would you say the same is required for other instincts? For example, is a perfect standard of food balance needed for us to draw upon in achieving nutrition? Is a perfect standard of exercises needed for us to draw upon in understanding how to act, and how to achieve physical health? Or do these instincts have some vital distinction that does not require an objective standard to be meaningful?

But you agree that awareness is still one step removed from the ground
of being, I wonder how much you've considered Aquinas' proofs to add to
the awareness.

I am not fully certain what this means, could you expand on it?

Does this make sense, when I say we can't view God univocally that means
that we can't judge him by our standards because He is in fact the
standard that everything is judged against?

It makes sense, which is to say it is coherent and reasonable, I simply do not believe it is true, or that the evidence supports it. The evidence to which I refer here is what I mentioned above, about the lack of consensus and shifts regarding morality across cultures and time, the utility of morality in forming strong social bonds and society, which provides a clear evolutionary advantage for its development, and the instinctive features of morality (In broad strokes present in all cultures, but showing significant variance across differing groups). I also maintain my prior position -- that the God to which you refer is indistinguishable by us from a God whose morality or immorality is unknowable.

This is the reasonable argument that I refer to: The graduated perfections of being actually existing in the universe can be understood only by comparison with an absolute standard that is also actual, i.e., an infinitely perfect Being such as God. (from Thomas Aquinas)
The definition you use for moral goodness seems to rely on the definition I just provided because otherwise the standard is creaturely and ever subject to change.
But you agree that awareness is still one step removed from the ground of being, I wonder how much you've considered Aquinas' proofs to add to the awareness.
Does this make sense, when I say we can't view God univocally that means that we can't judge him by our standards because He is in fact the standard that everything is judged against?

Classical theism does provide very reasonable support for God's existence

You don't need to go into detail, but I would appreciate a brief summary of the support to which you are referring, so I can identify if their is an argument with which I am unfamiliar.

I would think that you should try to refute classical theism.

As an amendment to the above, I would add that I will not be refuting classical theism in a dialogue. I will be responding to the concept of classical theism as held by the person or people to whom I am talking. I find that, with a concept like classical theism, there is often significant variation across those who hold it. As a result, I would rather understand the interpretation of the position held by the person to whom I am speaking prior to responding.

So we should discuss why your position is that God is not goodness instead of discussing whether actions attributed to God are good.

Perhaps that would be helpful. I believe that "goodness", in this case meaning moral goodness, is an instinctive drive present to some extent in all social animals, humans included. The basic drives, including respect of territory and life, cooperation, and sharing resources all help form and maintain social bonds while also defending against outside threats. Across cultures, variance in moral rules also is consistent with an instinctive drive, rather than an objective code. This suggests to me that goodness is an evolved drive, not an objective thing people are trying to understand -- put a group of people together to describe something objective, and you will generally reach a consensus eventually, but morality continues to have significant variation across cultures, despite cross dialogue.

Maybe you also could tell me what you consider to be the ground of all being from your own philosophy.

All being is a broad topic. The fairest answer would be "I don't know", especially since we are still discovering things that speak to the nature of all things. However, I do not want to leave it there, because I do have a partial answer. I believe the ground of our being is the expression of our evolved nature as it is in contact with sensory information from the world, and it is hard for people to separate this ground from the ground of everything. As a good example, we are conscious beings, and everything we sense is turned into perceived objects within the mind. For that reason, everything we experience does have an element of agency and consciousness -- we infer qualities in making sense of it. This, I believe, is why people tend to anthropomorphize -- for example, yelling at machines that are not working. I further suspect that the concept of God as expressed in the Abrahamic faiths is, itself, an anthropomorphizing of the abstract concept of community itself -- of patriarchy, hierarchy, moral rules and social bonds, with an additional element of good luck as divine providence.

So, to answer your question, I believe the ground of our being is awareness. The ground of awareness is a gestalt of thought, emotion, memory, sense data, and instinctive drives within us that, through their interrelation, give rise to that awareness. As to the ground beyond that, I do not know, and I have never met someone who claimed to know who convinced me that they did actually know. I have, however, met many people who claim competing hypotheses on the ground of being with equal conviction, presenting arguments that are often quite similar to support dissimilar conclusions, because the evidence and arguments in question do not necessarily support any of the hypotheses. For this reason, I do not rule out God as the ground of being. I simply see no reason to believe God is the ground of being.

EDIT: Fixed a block quote.

Thank you, an excellent response.

I just find it to be a position that renders God into something that is immune to any evaluation that might be used to challenge whether God exists.

Classical theism does provide very reasonable support for God's existence, although many atheists don't consider it immune from a challenge to His existence. Theistic personalism does not provide such a reasoned approach and is easier to challenge; but I don't think that you would base your worldview on the idea that theistic personalism can be used to show that God does not exist so that is the theology that should be refuted. I would think that you should try to refute classical theism.

So we should discuss why your position is that God is not goodness instead of discussing whether actions attributed to God are good. We can discuss God's actions as detailed in the bible but that has to come afterwards. In fact I think theistic personalism originates from studying the bible without first considering the nature of God as explained by classical theism.

Maybe you also could tell me what you consider to be the ground of all being from your own philosophy.

I would agree that we have different assumptions, and here is where I think the issue may be: I do not think that something which is attributed agency can also be the standard for morality. Morality is the standard for how intelligent agency should be expressed. For example, in the Old Testament, God is said to command several genocidal acts. To me, there is a standard that can be applied to that command, and it does not endorse the command as moral. Whether this is interpreted to be the actual command of God, the faulty interpretation of imperfect followers, or something else, once something is said to have and be expressing intelligent agency, that agency can be understood according to how well it follow the standard.

How one ought to act must be distinguished from the act itself, or morality as a standard becomes meaningless. To me, the approach you suggest sets aside moral standards entirely when it comes to God: God, being the standard, by definition becomes moral. Actual adherence to moral standards is bypassed as irrelevant. However, I see no difference between this position and a position that is agnostic as to the Goodness of God, save whether that Goodness is assumed to be necessary.

I believe that I do understand the God of Classical Theism. I just find it to be a position that renders God into something that is immune to any evaluation that might be used to challenge whether God exists. Which is to say, the idea tries to present itself as something necessary to the standards and conditions that could be used to challenge whether God might exist. God is the ground of being, therefore nothing that exists could suggest God does not exist, since God is the ground. God is the standard of morality, therefore no immorality could suggest God does not exist, since God is the standard. I generally hesitate to accept any position if I can see no way that I would be able to test or evaluate if the position is right or wrong.

I appreciate this discussion but I think we are referring to two different sets of assumptions about the nature of God. Feser deals with this problem in the OP. The differing assumptions are theistic personalism versus classical theism. I agree with Feser and still I had to re-read his explanations several times, he refers the reader to other blog posts.
Basically, we'll be unable to consider the problem of evil if you view God as someone who should act in a certain way while I view God as the standard against which all acts are measured. So if you are interested in backing up a little and reading about God from a classical theism understanding then we can move forward with our discussion, otherwise you are inadvertently arguing against a straw man.

Hello Rob,

Your welcome, and I hope this response is also of interest.

Why would we ask for supernatural intervention that only made the situation better by a degree, if there is to be supernatural intervention it should be to the highest degree possible or else there will always be the question of why not better than that.

When others help me, I am grateful, even if they could have done more. This is not a demand for more no matter how much is given. It is a matter of basic moral conduct to prevent evil. There is a point where nonintervention itself becomes immoral.

1) The notion that there is perfect goodness or justice points to God so a cry for justice rules out the nonexistence of God.

Moral instincts have been a central part of human evolutionary success in building strong social units, and do not demonstrate God. If anything, the general similarity but differing details in moral thinking across cultures demonstrate an instinctive trend, rather than an objective morality. I do not believe that perfect goodness or justice exist. I find that even earnest people trying in good faith to define these things disagree significantly in basic areas. I think that we all form a sense of what justice and goodness are based on our own experiences, which is subject to change with new experiences. People do change their minds on what is moral and immoral, while also judging how well situations measure up to their current sense of how the people involved should act.

2) Is univocal as it compares perfect goodness to human morality

I find this sort of claim problematic, as people have no issue talking about God from the standard of human morality when it is favorable, such as good things being divine providence. It is only when the standard would indicate immorality that it becomes inappropriate. On the other hand, I think that a person taking a strong agnostic position as to the morality of God would be able to present a reasonable argument that supports your point. However, the problem of evil does not apply against such a position, anyways, and Christianity does not hold this position. I do not believe one can claim morality applies to something (as it does if something is morally perfect) and then reject applying moral standards to evaluate that claim.

3) is the most probable with the moral ground being freedom.

We want to raise our children to be independent. It does not mean we do not intervene when they do things that are wrong to minimize damage and impose consequences that may correct the behavior, or to prevent others from hurting them. I am a generally moral person, and I know a number of other people who are also moral in conduct, and we are all quite free and distinct in our choices. Evil is unnecessary for freedom, and the desire to foster freedom does not preclude intervening against evil acts. In fact, it is often the lack of prevention of evil that is the barrier to freedom -- the victims of evil often have their freedom taken from them through the act.

Why would we ask for supernatural intervention that only made the situation better by a degree, if there is to be supernatural intervention it should be to the highest degree possible or else there will always be the question of why not better than that. Again I would say this is logically impossible based on there being only one of the perfect goodness.
Regarding your three points:
1) The notion that there is perfect goodness or justice points to God so a cry for justice rules out the nonexistence of God. 2) Is univocal as it compares perfect goodness to human morality, but you don't seem to support that 3) is the most probable with the moral ground being freedom.
But justice doesn't have to wait for heaven or hell, it can often be served here on earth, by the one who sins or unfortunately by future generations (getting biblical here, Numbers 14:18).

Thanks for the response.

I will do my best to expand on my position

I think that certain evil demands intervention. Where a child, for example, is being molested, tortured and murdered, there is an ethical obligation to prevent that act. The people in question doing the evil acts are certainly not the created with and expressing the highest good. That's fine. But if I would say that a human, aware of the act and able to prevent it, would be failing in a moral sense if they did not do so, then I am left with three options regarding God. 1) God does not exist, so further questions about God's morality are irrelevant. 2) God does exist, and has demonstrated by not intervening that God is not perfectly moral, just as a human would have. 3) God does exist, and by some logic or reason allows the horrific evil that occurs on moral grounds. 3) is possible, and I have heard reasoning that tries to justify 3). However, 1) is also possible, and requires no efforts to reason that allowing evil might be moral.

In response to your answer to this problem, I would have two thoughts. First, it would not be necessary to make everything good, only to prevent evil from harming those who are blameless or good. The concept of heaven and hell often seems much like this: the good people live in paradise, while the bad people suffer for their badness, and the two are separate. A simplification of Christian theology, and certainly not universally held in Christianity, but it does capture this concept. Second, I believe that a part of morality is the desire to make others better, and so I would still expect that there would be intervention that protected victims from being traumatized and provide some sort of disciplinary action against the perpetrators. These are the sort of acts that humans take in the name of justice, and I would hope that a purported greatest or highest justice would at least resemble this as well, and not just in a proposed final judgment after death.

David, you also said: "I continue to hold the view that, where evil occurs and there are no people present to stop it, it is not stopped by God because no God with the inclination to stop it is present, either."
On this point we agree but probably with different reasoning. I think God doesn't have the inclination to stop the evil we see because that would entail making everything good, and I define the highest level of goodness as Being, as God, and He would not be able to create others equal in goodness to the highest good. Not because He lacks the power or inclination to do so but because it is logically impossible to have more than one of the greatest good.
Why do you say the inclination is absent? I don't think it follows that since there is no inclination then there is no God but I would like to hear your explanation, if you don't mind.