Vallicella writes: "Thus I have two proper parts, soul and body, the first is essential to me, the second accidental."

It appears that this matter turns on what is meant by the term, "accidental."

If a thing is accidental because the substance can exist without it, then Vallicella is correct.

But, I don't think that alone grasps sufficiently the essential role that the body plays in human existence.

Man barely escapes being merely the "slime of the earth." Materialists are so enamored with his bodily existence that they entirely deny the spiritual soul. All knowledge comes through the senses, which cannot function without bodily organs. The intellect can know the singular solely by "turning to the phantasm." Indeed, intellectual knowledge of universal concepts is possible in this life solely by abstracting from the phantasm, which is an internal sense object existing under the conditions of matter.

The point is that man's essential definition is that of a "rational animal." While "rational" is the specific difference, the genus is "animal."

And while the spiritual soul can exist independently of the body, it is stripped of its normal means by which it obtains the richness of its intellectual knowledge -- mostly dependent in its separated state on direct infusion of knowledge from God.

These are some of the reasons that saying that the body is merely "accidental" to the soul because the soul can exist independently of the body misses the broader truth that the essence of man necessarily includes both soul and body.

Man is a curious hybrid whose complete nature includes both soul and body, while at the same time being able to retain existence as an "incomplete substance" after death. This means that, while the soul or form still exists, it is stripped of essential properties needed for the complete human nature.

Valicella defined compound substance dualism re philosophy of mind so:

"B. Compound Substance Dualism. This is the view that I am a composite of soul and body, which implies that my body is a proper part of me. Thus I have two proper parts, soul and body, the first essential to me, the second accidental. I cannot exist without my soul, but I can exist without my body, where 'can' expresses broadly logical possibility."

His point was that in his view, hylomorphic dualism doesn't differ enough from compound substance dualism to escape the difficulties of the latter. HD just adds the notion of form.

Your distinction requires that the soul perform operations "independent of ... bodily organs" and that, therefore, the spiritual soul is known to subsist [and exist] as a substance independent of the body. That of course is held by A-T. I gather that Vallicella, who is sympathetic to much of Thomism, nevertheless rejects those supporting premises.

Hylemorphism is grounded in the fact that substantially unified bodies exist above the "atomic" level, which, thereby, require some "principle" of unity. That principle of unity is called the substantial form. Form plays several roles in hylemorphism. Form (1) gives substantial unity, (2) determines the nature and species of the substance, (3) gives "esse" to the substance as "this" thing, and (4) actively determines the matter as to specificity.

It is alleged that it is contradictory for this form both to have independent existence, and yet, merely to be a principle which plays a role in the formation of things having independent existence. Is it a substance itself -- having independent existence, or merely a principle of a substance -- not having independent existence?

It is clear in the case of material bodies that form is merely a principle that lacks independent existence, since none of its operations take place independent of matter. Even in sentient organisms, the form acts so as to apprehend its object under the conditions of matter in the cognition of external sense objects and images.

But the human organism has a different and unique substantial form, which is clearly dependent on matter for some of its operations, such as just mentioned, but independent of matter in other operations, such as the formation of universal concepts.

In the case of man, then, we have a different kind of form from the rest of bodily substances. Is this special pleading? Of course, it is. But it is justified because the human substance is a uniquely special hybrid of spirit and matter.

What makes this very different from substance dualism, though, is that this is not a case of a form having independent existence and a body having independent existence from its form. Any body, which is a complete substance, loses its unity if it loses its form -- which is to lose its substantial existence as well. The only way that the form of such substances can exist is in union with its body, since such forms have no operations independent of the body.

But the human form is uniquely different. Since it has operations utterly independent of matter, it continues to exist after death, that is, after losing its union with the body.

But, unlike substance dualism, the substantial form of man does not have fully independent existence from matter in some of its operations. Man's complete essence entails essential properties radically dependent on bodily organs for their operations. Thus, the substantial form after death no longer animates a complete substance, since some of its essential properties -- those dependent on matter -- are no longer operative and existent, except in potential to a bodily resurrection.

Thus, the alleged contradiction between substantial form apparently having both dependent existence and independent existence is avoided by way of a proper distinction -- in the case of man. For, with respect to those properties of the form that depend on bodily organs for operation, the complete essence does not survive the death of the body, and hence, cease to exist or have independent existence. But with respect to those essential properties that operate completely independent of the body, continued independent existence obtains.

Rather than substantial form "smacking of a contradiction" in the case of the human complete essence, a proper distinction allows that -- in the case of this unique human form alone -- the form plays two distinct roles: one in which it does not manifest independent existence of operation, and the other, in which it manifests such total independence.

This conclusion is not merely a matter of defending a hypothetical doctrine of hylemorphism, but rather is forced upon us by the evident reality that the human organism has both operations dependent on bodily organs as well as operations clearly independent of such bodily organs.

https://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2011/08/three-dualisms-simple-compound-and-hylomorphic.html

Vallicella's objection is this: "form and matter are 'principles' invoked in the analysis of primary substances but not primary substances themselves... A form is not a primary substance because it is not broadly logically capable of independent existence... [Yet] the intellectus on the Thomist view must be viewed as [a] substance[s], as capable of independent existence. Aquinas expresses this by referring to the soul as a subsistent form.

But 'subsistent form' smacks of contradiction. How can a form be subsistent? To say that a form is subsistent is to say that it is a primary substance, that it is broadly logically capable of independent existence. But a form is precisely not a primary substance but a 'principle' invoked in the analysis of primary substances. Aquinas cannot do justice to his own insight into the independence of the intellect from matter from within the hylomorphic scheme of ontological analysis he inherits from Aristotle.... So I cannot see that hylomorphic dualism is any improvement over pure substance dualism. It is rather a step backward."

Thoughts?

>If nobody's put a video camera in your visual cortex, how do you know it won't see any image?

WhatdoesthishavetodowiththepriceofteainChina?

I know I will see an image in my mind as I am seeing it while I type it. My question and the one Dr. B was asking, the one you have been avoiding is where, physically is that image I am seeing in my brain? The data on a dvd produces an image on a screen. The data in my brain about Theresa produces an image in my mind. But the screen is a physical thing extended in 3d space. Where the actual FFFF............udge is the Fudging image physically manifesting itself in my Brain? Where is the TV screen? I don't care if somebody thinks they found a way to decode the data in my brain to reconstruct an image I saw. I want to know where the image that his happening now is physically manifesting itself in the physical world if all is matter alone and nothing else?

You haven't even tried to answer that question. Now bugger off!

If nobody's put a video camera in your visual cortex, how do you know it won't see any image?

You lost me.

How do you know if no one's looked?

Yer false either/or fallacy question doesn't assume my definition of omnibenevolence but yer own definition ergo it is invalid.

God wills our good by creating us in the first place and giving us truly sufficient grace to be saved in the second place. Neither of these gifts he owes us and therefore any further gifts He could grant he doesn't owe us and He doesn't owe us a world with no ebola.

It is not a valid question and I don't answer "Do you still beat yer wife" type questions. There are no literal images on my brain.