The Catholic Church's conception of God is a lot more than "the first cause and a necessary being". According to the Church, God is also omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient, omnipresent, transcendent, immutable, eternal, and three persons in one being, and he intervenes in the material word, became incarnate as the son of the virgin Mary, died for our sins, resurrected after his crucifixion, inspired the Biblical authors and the Catholic Magisterium to make their teachings infallible, wants a personal relationship with each person, and wants us to be united with him in heaven. To say that arguments that don't even establish the existence of a conscious being even if they are sound are proofs of the Catholic conception of God is disingenuous.

The Kalam cosmological argument is logically invalid if the conclusion is meant to be the existence of God because all it is able to conclude is that the Universe had a cause. In order to make the argument valid, you need an additional premise saying, "If the Universe had a cause, that cause is God," but there is no good reason at all for asserting such a premise.
The first premise of the Kalam is given virtually no justification in most expositions, and I see no reason to believe in it. Electron-positron pairs are just one example of something that can come into existence without a cause, and they do so all the time.
The second premise of the Kalam is true if you take "Universe" to mean "everything that has existed as part of our connected spacetime manifold since the Planck epoch", but if you take "Universe" to mean anything wider in scope than that (for example, if you take it to mean the whole of material reality), there is no reason to believe that the second premise is true. Our current knowledge of cosmology doesn't include any statements about what happened before the Big Bang, let alone a claim that absolutely nothing happened before then, so physics can't be used to justify such a premise. The only other attempt to justify this premise are arguments against the possibility of an actual infinite, but those arguments are laughably poor. There are plenty of examples of actual infinities - the set of natural numbers, the set of numbers between 0 and 1, etc., and there are even concrete examples of actual infinities. Our best measurements show that the Universe is most likely infinite in spatial extent, and, given that the Universe is expanding and there is no reason to think it will stop, the temporal extent of the Universe is also infinite. (This makes it especially strange to assert that the past can't be infinite if the future is). If spacetime is continuous, then the number of locations/events within a given interval is also actually infinite.
So it looks like every premise of the Kalam has problems.

As for the contingency version, the second premise is incorrect because it assumes the nonexistence of brute facts without any justification. It is also incorrect to say that an infinite chain of contingent beings can't explain the existence of a contingent being - of course it can, the existence of prior beings in the infinite chain explains the contingent being in question. The only question is whether the entire chain can be explained (since none of the links in the chain can explain the whole chain).
The intuition for the second premise seems to rely on the principle of sufficient reason, but the PSR is provably false. Let "the Universe" refer here to the whole of contingent reality (again, this is a much wider scope than how it is used in physics). Then it is logically impossible that the Universe has a sufficient reason for its existence. Nothing contingent can be a sufficient reason for the Universe's existence because a part cannot explain the whole, but all contingent beings are a part of the Universe (due to our broad definition of Universe). Nothing necessary can be a sufficient reason for the Universe's existence because then the Universe itself would be necessary (this is an application of the modal inference rule that "A is necessary" and "Necessarily, A implies B" entail that "B is necessary"). You also can't combine the two in any way to get a sufficient reason either because a combination of a necessary being and a sufficient being is itself another contingent being.
This version of the argument also only works if you include the additional premise that, if a necessary being exists, it must be God, but that is clearly false. Are numbers God? Even if you don't think they are necessary beings, how would you justify the premise? At the very least, if you want me to call something "God", it needs to be conscious, but nothing in the argument points to a conscious being.
This argument at least has one true premise, but it is on no better footing than the first.

I think it is necessary to clarify what is meant by absolute truth. I think every skeptic agrees that that the law of non-contradiction and the statement, "There are no married bachelors," are absolutely true. The only time I ever hear people saying things like, "There is no absolute truth," it is when they are talking only about a specific type of truth, like moral truth, but these people are not making an absolute statement when they say that there is no absolute truth.
That being said, you are correct about the statements vs. meta-statements thing. In natural language, we can utter sentences that seem to talk about their own truth value, leading to paradoxes like the liar's paradox. In formal logic, however, this is not actually valid. If we want to talk about the truth of a statement in a particular language, we must define a truth predicate for that language. A truth predicate for a language L is a predicate T such that, for every proposition P expressible in L, T("P") iff P, where "P" is the expression in L representing P. As it turns out, however, most languages can't define their own truth predicate - any language that is expressive enough that it would otherwise be able to form liar-like statements cannot, and, in particular, any language capable of expressing arithmetic can't define its own truth predicate. However, you can still express truth in the language L by using a new language, Meta-L, that includes all of the syntax and semantics of L, plus a truth predicate True1 that takes in statements in L (but not all statements in Meta-L). Then we can create a language Meta-Meta-L that contains a truth predicate True2 for Meta-L, and so on. You will notice that this strategy dissolves the liar's paradox. If a well-formed sentence in a language L says, "This sentence is not T," T can't be the truth predicate for L, although it might be the truth predicate for some other language. For example, if we have a language OL, a meta-language ML for OL, and a meta-meta-language MM, then, "This sentence is not true1," is true2 but not true1. It is not true1 because it is not a sentence in OL, which is the language that true1 is the truth predicate for (it is not a sentence in OL because OL can't contain the predicate true1). It is, however, true2 because it is a true statement in ML. In natural language, the liar's paradox can therefore be seen to result from ambiguity in the truth predicate (since natural languages don't make any distinction between truth predicates for regular parts of the language and "meta" parts of the language).
When it comes to the argument for absolute truth, you could dispose of it in a similar way by saying that no "non-meta" statements are absolutely true, i.e., no statements are absolutely true1 (the language that true1 applies to could just be English without the truth predicate or something similar). The statement, "No statements are absolutely true1," could be absolutely true2 without contradicting itself. However, even though I agree with you that the argument that it is self-refuting to say, "There is no absolute truth," is wrong, I don't think it's actually very relevant because there is a much simpler argument for the existence of absolute truths, namely, "'All bachelors are unmarried,' is an absolute truth. Therefore, there are absolute truths," and this argument is sound, so it won't be refuted in the way that the "roadrunner technique" can be refuted. The better response then, is to do the following: If you say that there are no absolute truths in a very particular context, e.g. if you say there are no moral absolutes, then the statement that there are no absolute truths is probably not a statement that falls under that context, e.g. "There are no moral absolutes," is not a moral absolute. If you aren't talking about a specific context, or if it's not clear that you are, then just don't say, "There are no absolute truths," because it isn't absolutely true that there are no absolute truths, given that we have examples. If someone accuses "skeptics" or you in particular of claiming something you haven't actually claimed, then their argument is a fallacious strawman and you can refute it as such.

1)By pointing to a distinction of "G-D" (as defined as "Creator of the physical world") and all those G-Ds that we do KNOW, like YHWH and Allah) you have provided the most relevant Input of this commentary section.
2)All that we !!!DO!!! know of, !!!ALTHOUGH!!! it is for itself non-physical, is a human thought. In other words, not only are all the Parameters of physics, like space, time, power, energy momentarily-created ("fabricated") by the brain, but all !!!THOSE!!! and !!!ONLY!!! all those G-Ds that we DO know, are human thoughts, imaginations, descriptions, properties, ILLUSIONS, in other words they share the same realm (nature of existence) with space, time, laws. Kindest regards from GERMANY, from a born-again Atheist who does NOT say "there is NO G-D"...
3)who rather KNOWS that all KNOWN G-Ds are imaginary descriptions, and as such the non physical aequivalen t of a physical cult object like the famous "Golden Bull" - in other words all theists are unbenownst to them, but effectivbely, what they detest, namely Idolators.
4)All Arguments for the existence of G-D are suffering from ambiguity. Even if some argument compellingly suggests "personality" this "personality" cannot be exploited in order to suggest ONE G-D. The assumption "number of G-Ds = 1" is as invaliud as is "number of G-Ds = 0" we are AGnostic about number of G-Ds/creators/coinciding (parallel) causes. Indeed, the Cosmo Logical "Argument'" suffers from an invalid praesupposition "number of uncaused first-causes = 1" in other words, all pontifical attempt (bridgebuilding) namely between "G-D" and "One's known G-D" will fail. For this reason I have never even tried to analyze where the Logical fallacy in goedel's Argument is exactly located. It does not make sense. Goedel's Argument, like the others, either does not prove anything or it proves the existence of the Great Zampano, Ramen and HummDooLeeLooYEAH!

It seems you need to study the arguments a little deeper then. For instance if the moral argument is correct then that certianly would prove a personal God. Cosmological arguments and design arguments can also prove that God is personal because only a personal being can choose or conceive of what is going to be created or designed. Once we establish that God must be personal and if the argument allows for Him being perfect (which I think some of them do, as they lead to Him being unlimited, such as one of Aquinas' cosmological arguments, take a look at some of Ed Feser's writings on this issue if you're interested) then I think that conclusion necessarily leads to theism, as it would be imperfect for a perfect being to not hep His creation. Then after theism is accepted we can look at the various religions and their leaders, scripture etc. In my view Jesus is the most profound religious leader and a person that we can reasonably believe was God (as long as we are open to the rationality that God would reveal Himself in a direct way to humanity, as that would reasonably be a more perfect thing for God to do). That may seem like a lot of leaps to you, but you should consider that perhaps the leaps are justified, you never know.

It is amusing at least.

I'd say the best one I've seen recently is by "counter apologist". In a nutshell it makes just as much sense to say 1) everything material that exists has a material cause. 2) something material has always existed.

if the universe began to exist, it must have a cause.

This presumption has no support.

First, the only things we know of that began to exist didn't begin to exist from 'nothing'; they all began from 'something(s)' already in the universe. That gives us no basis on which to say whether what comes from 'nothing' requires a cause nor, if caused, what the nature of that cause would be.

Second, physics has proven that several things in our universe come into existence without a cause.

Third, the Universe (as opposed to our temporal universe) may have existed eternally outside of time in a smooth, hot, dense state and, for no readily apparent reason, expansion started 13.81 billion years ago. Perhaps that's just what universes do. This idea fits the facts better than positing a deity that must have existed eternally in order to have started our universe:

(A) We have no evidence of minds absent a physical brain.

(B) We have no evidence of a supernatural realm or supernatural entities.

(C) The evidence points not to a complex universe that required lots of technical expertise to create it all but instead a very simple universe of one kind of stuff (no Intelligent Designer required). All the rest of the universe comes from this very simple beginning according to the nature of the matter, energy, forces and fields that we are learning about.