So the naturally advantageous results of following our conscience may be the result of God’s genius and careful planning.

Or what we think are moral codes are just the by product of what is naturally advantageous to a species of social primates. And since we're all the same species, this moral code seems universal in every culture, and we mistakenly think that this entails a moral law giver.

Thank you for saying more about your position.

I don’t know any proof that I’m right to affirm [the fact–value dichotomy] …

Granted, if moral objectivism is true, then my argument fails, but to prove me wrong merely by affirming moral objectivism is to beg the question.

These two bits seem contradictory: to merely affirm the fact–value dichotomy allows your argument to proceed, but merely affirming it is to beg the question. But perhaps you think you're walking a middle path between "merely affirming" and "proving"?

Next: The approval or disapproval expressed by moral judgments are feelings. We don’t form moral judgments about matters that we have no feelings about.

I don't see why anyone would accept this; scientists don't expend years of time investigating phenomena they have no feelings about. I'm not sure how you're adding anything substantial to your original "Conscience is a feeling."

The answer to my question, “Are people referring to anything other than these feelings when they talk about conscience?” seems to be: They think they are.

You've said as much already; the question is why such people ought to believe they are wrong. You've pointed out disagreement as to what conscience is, but there is also disagreement about scientific realism vs. scientific anti-realism—so we have to be very careful about what we do with the bare fact of disagreement.

 
I would like to work with a modified version of what you said above:

DS: We don’t form moral judgments about matters that we have no feelings about deem [completely] unimportant.

Before I do so, would you agree or disagree with that modification?

To which particular opinion are you referring?

The context is clearly your claim that "Conscience is a feeling. . . . you aren't willing to defend the opinion central to your objection to the OP.
"

The notion that you might seriously think it was something else took me some getting used to.

One of the bases of my defense is the fact-value dichotomy, which you have rejected. You and I discussed that a great length in another thread, and we eventually discovered that you and I don’t mean the same thing when we’re using the word “fact.” That could be a partial explanation for your rejection of the dichotomy. Whatever; you and I disagree about the fact-value dichotomy. I don’t know any proof that I’m right to affirm it, but your defense of your rejection consisted mainly of quotes from a handful of philosophers who reject it for reasons that don’t appear cogent to me.

Next: I don’t believe that any purely ethical statement is a statement of fact. Ethical principles are one of many kinds of value judgments that we make. The objection that this reduces moral disagreements to mere differences of opinion is misguided. Opinions are not by their nature either unjustifiable or trivial. Some are quite consequential in terms of the behavior that they motivate, and there is no reason their justification cannot be stated in terms of such consequences, i.e. by appealing to facts. To affirm the fact-value dichotomy is not to deny a relationship between facts and values. To say they are the same thing is not to say that one is irrelevant to the other.

Next: Some sense of a difference between moral right and moral wrong is a part of what most of us call human nature. This means, at minimum and uncontroversially, that all people throughout human history have in some sense disapproved of some behaviors and approved of some others. The sense in question is what we call the moral sense, to distinguish it from other kinds of approval/disapproval such as what is applied to mere social manners. We can disapprove of breaches of etiquette without accusing their perpetrators of behaving immorally. We may find the distinction hard to define, but our intuition, as revealed by our actual behavior, says there is a difference. We just don’t treat people with bad manners the same way we treat people with bad morals. Possibly, in some societies, there is no useful distinction between manners and morals, but I know of no society in which there is no distinction between behaviors judged to be morally right and behaviors judged to be morally wrong.

When it comes to particular behaviors that are so judged, humanity has exhibited a remarkable but not infinite diversity. The list of behaviors that are disapproved of by no known society is short. From this we may infer that the human mind naturally perceives some distinction between right and wrong but, with a handful of exceptions, does not naturally perceive that any particular behavior is wrong.

Next: I have used “approved/disapproved” and “right/wrong” interchangeably for a reason. I have seen no one propose a distinction that would be useful in the present context. To disapprove of an action is to judge it to be wrong, and to judge it wrong is to express disapproval. Every proposed further distinction I have seen presupposes some form of moral objectivism. Granted, if moral objectivism is true, then my argument fails, but to prove me wrong merely by affirming moral objectivism is to beg the question.

Next: The approval or disapproval expressed by moral judgments are feelings. We don’t form moral judgments about matters that we have no feelings about. A person’s expression of emotional indifference toward any behavior is taken to be evidence of at least their moral indifference if not their moral approval: If I say that I don’t care whether people do X, then other people will infer that I have judged X to be morally unobjectionable.

Next: The question: Are people referring to anything other than these feelings when they talk about conscience? The OED begins its entry for conscience thus:

I. Senses involving consciousness of morality or what is considered right.
1.

a. The internal acknowledgement or recognition of the moral quality of one's motives and actions; the sense of right and wrong as regards things for which one is responsible; the faculty or principle which judges the moral quality of one's actions or motives. Now also in weakened sense: one's awareness of what is advisable or acceptable for one to do.

Opinions as to the nature, function, and authority of conscience are widely divergent, including that it is: (i) practical reasoning about moral matters, which, though fallible, must be obeyed (Aquinas); (ii) the understanding which distinguishes between right and wrong and between virtue and vice; (iii) an infallible, God-given guide of conduct; (iv) a sense of personal or individual morality as opposed to customary or social morality (Hegel); (v) a sense of guilt and unworthiness which arises when aggressive impulses are denied external expression (Nietzsche); (vi) an aspect of the superego, the internal perception of the rejection of a particular wish (Freud).

That is a lot of nuance, but for an inquiry into general usage, I think we can focus on (i) - (iii).

The answer to my question, “Are people referring to anything other than these feelings when they talk about conscience?” seems to be: They think they are. That is to say, “My conscience tells me so” is the answer people give when asked, “How do you know that X is wrong?” and they clearly don’t think they’re saying nothing more than “I don’t approve of X.” They are saying that, but they intend to be saying something else besides, because most people get it that “I don’t like X” is not a sufficient reason for moral condemnation of X. They intuit the necessity of appealing to some faculty of their minds that perceives whatever it is about X that justifies their moral disapproval—the particular kind of disapproval applicable to moral judgments as opposed to mere social or personal judgments. But this intuition presupposes the existence of that “whatever it is,” because otherwise there would be nothing for that mental faculty to perceive. And what shall we call that faculty? Most English speakers call it their conscience. Thus I interpret the OED.

Next: This is all consistent with my initial response to the OP, provided I am not mistaken in rejecting moral objectivism. A naturalistic explanation of conscience need not presuppose that its “nature, function, and authority” are what people think they are, particularly when (as the OED informs us) they don’t agree among themselves about what they are.

A possible objection may remain: The faculty that I have labeled “conscience” might produce feelings, but that doesn’t mean the faculty itself is a feeling. That would indeed be a good distinction to make in some contexts. But in the more general context of explaining why we have such a faculty and how we came to have it, my argument is that, having explained the relevant feelings, we have explained the conscience.

The context is clearly your claim that "Conscience is a feeling." You have definitely defended opinions of yours in the past. It just happens that you aren't willing to defend the opinion central to your objection to the OP.

After all, merely asserting your opinion is not a defense.

To which particular opinion are you referring? Or are you claiming that I have defended none of them?

LB: Sure, you've asserted your own definitions/​characterizations with zero defense.

DS′: My defense is common usage based on inferences from what I’ve learned from my studies of metaphysics. Most people, when they talk about conscience, seem to me to be talking about the same thing I mean by moral instinct.

LB: Would you be willing to articulate those "inferences" and that "seem"? (If so, please do so.) After all, to defend "I think that X" with "it seems to me that X" is not a real defense. Nor is "I have reasons to believe X" a real defense.

DS: I would, if I had the time to write an intelligible articulation and if it would fit in a forum post. Neither is the case, however.

Ah, so you teased me with what seemed awfully like promises to articulate—

DS: Of course characterizations, like any other assertions, have to be defended—when they are challenged.

+

DS: Waiting until I’m asked for a defense is not a refusal to defend.

—and now have refused to do so. After all, merely asserting your opinion is not a defense.

Why would it matter if the dictionary noted that 2. isn't merely a rationalization?

Because whether it is or is not a rationalization is not a lexicographical issue. It is a philosophical issue.

Would you be willing to articulate those "inferences" and that "seem"?

I would, if I had the time to write an intelligible articulation and if it would fit in a forum post. Neither is the case, however. Fortunately for you, whatever I can say without further argument, you may deny without further argument.

Being able to compare & contrast your own views with commonly held/​discussed views can be a very effective way of communicating.

It can be effective in some contexts. I believe that in most contexts, the most effective way to communicate my beliefs is just to state them, particularly when I'm using them as premises in an argument.

I don’t think that, and I never said I did.

Then I don't understand your answer here:

LB: Suppose that the dictionary noted that 2. is not merely a rationalization. Would you then have a problem … ?

DS: Yes, I would.

After all, "Dictionaries record usage, which is intended meaning: what people think they are saying when they use the word." Why would it matter if the dictionary noted that 2. isn't merely a rationalization? That would be more opinion which you could just steamroll over.

At this point, I can now better understand what you meant:

LB: Sure, you've asserted your own definitions/​characterizations with zero defense.

DS′: My defense is common usage based on inferences from what I’ve learned from my studies of metaphysics. Most people, when they talk about conscience, seem to me to be talking about the same thing I mean by moral instinct.

Would you be willing to articulate those "inferences" and that "seem"? (If so, please do so.) After all, to defend "I think that X" with "it seems to me that X" is not a real defense. Nor is "I have reasons to believe X" a real defense.

I have some interest in telling people what I believe and why I believe it. I have almost no interest in proving that what I say fits neatly into somebody’s philosophical taxonomy.

Being able to compare & contrast your own views with commonly held/​discussed views can be a very effective way of communicating. It is also rather unlikely that you deviate very much from views already held; people just tend not to innovate all that much over what has been done before. Whether or not the innovations people do make are heeded or suppressed is another matter; have I given you reason to think I'm trying to suppress your own and put you in a box? If so, I'd like to know how it appears that way.

why do you think it is acceptable to interpret "2. the complex of ethical and moral principles that controls or inhibits the actions or thoughts of an individual." as merely "rationalize our feelings"

I don’t think that, and I never said I did. You’re the one doing the interpreting. Dictionaries record usage, which is intended meaning: what people think they are saying when they use the word. This particular usage reflects certain metaphysical assumptions that I think are mistaken. I was explaining what I think this mistake consists of and how it became an established usage.

the dictionary itself says no such thing

It’s not the dictionary editors’ job to say such things. That is the job of philosophers.

I personally find it hard to see much difference between WP: Emotivism and WP: Ethical subjectivism. Key to both appears to be a rooting of ethics in emotion. I have yet to see any interesting distinction between propositions about emotion and expressions of emotion.

I have some interest in telling people what I believe and why I believe it. I have almost no interest in proving that what I say fits neatly into somebody’s philosophical taxonomy. Whether Wikipedia’s editors would classify me as an emotivist or an ethical subjectivist, I couldn’t care less.

That was an unexpected answer

Your expectations are a function of your personal history. I can’t do anything about that.

Have you never seen "two sides of the same coin" used that way?

No, I haven't. I've always seen it used to mean "In a certain important respect, they're pretty much the same thing."