I find your work and Fr. Spitzers' work very insightful. I had two questions about this article if you had the time.

1) You explained, "if this incompatible state of being, 'not X,' would exclude from itself and be incompatible with the only thing that could ultimately fulfill its conditions for existence, namely unconditioned reality, then it could not in principle be real or really possible—i.e., it couldn’t exist or even possibly exist." It seems as if you are already assuming that "unconditioned reality" is one single reality. But at this point in the proof, it has not been proven that unconditioned reality is unique. For the moment, let's imagine multiple unconditioned realities X, Y, and Z. If X is restricted, I understand that "not X" would be incompatible with X. But because we're imagining multiple unconditioned realities, X does not necessarily have to ultimately fulfill the conditions for "not X." The conditions for "not X" could be fulfilled by unconditioned reality Y or Z. So, why does there have to be only one unconditioned reality?

2) You say that for any reality that is restricted, there are "real or really possible" incompatible states on the same level of simplicity. By "really possible" do you mean not logically self-contradictory? Just because something is not logically self-contradictory does not necessarily mean it is actually possible, right? Something must have a means for existing (unless its unconditioned). Therefore, why does there need to be a reality that is absolutely simple? It appears to me that there only needs to be a reality that is simpler than any actually existing reality, not that there needs to be an absolutely simple reality.

The Unconditioned Reality is perfectly loving and knows the damage that buying condoms will do to your soul and to others.

Karlo:

I can see how the interaction thesis is plausible, given the examples you've given, but I can't see its necessity. The fact that we can't imagine a situation in which two exclusive realities interact doesn't mean in 50 years some physicists won't discover exclusive entities that do interact in such a way.

Just think how long we accepted Euclid's parallel postulate before the advent of non-Euclidean geometry! I'm always uncomfortable with an argument using the current limits of our imagination to establish a priori necessity. Particularly in this argument you and Fr. Spitzer have presented, because I think it's airtight everywhere else.

Moreover, it seems that there are metaphysical views that do not require real mediums like space and time for substances to interact. If, as the Thomist W. Norris Clarke argues, space and time are abstractions of the properties or relations of substances, and if, further, those relations are internal to those substances, there is no need to posit the real existence of an independent medium in which such things interact. That is, on (at least one form of) Thomist metaphysics, space and time are not realities, but abstractions we generate in our minds from the properties of things. It seems clear to me that substances could then be viewed as interacting without a simpler medium.

Hey Thomas,

Thanks for the insightful questions. I will be honest and say that I will have to dig a little deeper to construct a clearer articulation of this point. I spoke with Fr. for a short period and he basically said that, a priori, how could two incompatible/excluded states of being have any sort of interrelationship/interaction/unification with one another unless there was some medium simpler than those exclusionary properties (e.g., electro. field with electrons and protons; light and particles & waves, etc) that allows for the interrelationship/interaction/unification. As Fr. said, if there was nothing more simple doing the unification of the opposed states then the opposed states would be totally unrelated - appealing again to the act of mentation that unifies the opposed states of square and circle. It is absolutely correct to say that the boundaries of square and circle prohibit them from being in the same place at the same time in the same respect, even in the mind, but there could be no sort of relationship (unification/interaction) among these contents of thought unless the mind is free of the boundaries of these thought contents (i.e., simpler in nature). But, like I said, I will have to dig a little deeper. Thanks again for the insightful thoughts.

Karlo:

I still am not sure I see the argument. Are you deducing the claim that exclusive realities cannot interact except through a simpler reality from the definition of exclusivity/incompatibility? That is, are you saying it follows analytically from the definitions? I don't see how the definition of exclusivity or boundaries (which I'm not sure has been given in the first place) entails that claim.

I'm not sure how you would make that argument without bringing in further metaphysical presuppositions. As I understand exclusivity/incompatibility, it is a thesis primarily about whether things can coexist at the same place and time. It would seem you need additional assumptions about causation in order to get to the non-interacting claim.

Not saying there's not an argument for it, but I don't think it's been made, unless its buried somewhere in these comments.

Paul: thanks to you too. I think you make some good points, and I'll be attempting to fix and clarify some areas of my own formulation of this argument you helped me see were underdeveloped.