Nonetheless, if every instant of our timeline (or more generally every point in spacetime) is timelessly real from God's point of view, they are timelessly real if 'real' is an absolute quality, not a relative one.

And that would be the incorrect conclusion to make from this.

Change is real, which means that myself as dead does not exist yet, just as my past self as a baby does not still exist.

The key is that the past, present, and future doesn't "collapse down" for God, but rather God "expands" so that all past, present, and future is simply the present for Him.

The confusion here is, I think, using tenses and terms like 'present' for a timeless being.

Nonetheless, if every instant of our timeline (or more generally every point in spacetime) is timelessly real from God's point of view, they are timelessly real if 'real' is an absolute quality, not a relative one.

I am sorry, I was working on something else at the same time and didn't explain things well.

So 2000, 2017 and 3000 are all equally real and existent to God, the only sense in which 'past' and 'future' are relevant to God are in relation to something other than himself, something that is in time, such as saying that "2000 is in the past to the ruggedly handsome Richard Morely as he writes that very insightful post in 2017".

That is correct, because God experiences all of "time" in a single moment everything is present all at once. The past, present, and future are not equally real because there is distinction between past, present and future for God, all is present. So to speak of past, present, and future all being real for God doesn't technically make sense because the past and future doesn't exist for God.

So only the present is real for God, but the present for God includes our past, present, and future.

The key distinction is that the future doesn't exist to God because there is no future for God. Everything is present.

As I would interpret it: Everything is present to him, sure, but that does not mean that the moments in time that we perceive as 'the past' or 'the future' do not exist to him, just that 'past' and 'future' are relative terms that have no relation to him.

To illustrate, and noting that I write this in the year 2017. To me now, 2017 is 'the present', 2000 is in 'the past', 3000 is in 'the future'. To God, all are 'present' (in a slightly different sense to saying that 2017 is the present to me right now). So 2000, 2017 and 3000 are all equally real and existent to God, the only sense in which 'past' and 'future' are relevant to God are in relation to something other than himself, something that is in time, such as saying that "2000 is in the past to the ruggedly handsome Richard Morely as he writes that very insightful post in 2017".

So that is an eternalist view of time, which (I maintain) presents no paradox in how a timeless God perceives it, nor in us talking about other moments in time or past events causing the present. In contrast for a naive interpretation of presentism both of those (and other issues) lead to paradox or nonsense. How can a timeless God perceive a dynamic moving present? How can you talk meaningfully about a past that is nonexistent in any absolute meaningful sense? What does it mean to say that time 'flows' or 'changes' with time? If past Me is totally nonexistant, who wrote what you are reading and why would you reply, let alone blame me for the pizza missing from your fridge? And so on.

But if God is outside of time, there is no 'when' to him. He cannot experience one thing 'now' and another thing 'later', all must be in his one timeless moment. So all moments are present to him at once, so all moments must be equally real.

Correct, everything is present to him all at once. It makes no sense to speak of past and future.

So all moments are present to him at once, so all moments must be equally real.

The key distinction is that the future doesn't exist to God because there is no future for God. Everything is present.

It would exist to God when it exists, and not-exist to God when it doesn't exist.

But if God is outside of time, there is no 'when' to him. He cannot experience one thing 'now' and another thing 'later', all must be in his one timeless moment. So all moments are present to him at once, so all moments must be equally real.

Or you put God into time, of course. But I see no way to reconcile a timeless God (or any timeless point of view) with presentism.

Ask yourself whether it exists to God, assuming you believe in a God who is timeless - outside of time as opposed to omnipresent in time.

It would exist to God when it exists, and not-exist to God when it doesn't exist.

To say God is outside of time is to say that everything is present to God at once. It isn't to say that the future exists to God, the future doesn't yet exist. But past, present, and future are all the present for God.

So my child does not yet exist and my cat no longer exists. It wouldn't be true to say my child or my cat actually exists. At most one could say is that my child exists in potency.

It is this point that is primary because if the past still exists then of course it could potentially have an effect on the present.

It is not that the past still exists, any more than New York exists in Wales. Language trap: anything existent exists where and when it exists, but "it does not exist elsewhere or elsewhen" is a statement of its location in spacetime, not its absolute existence or nonexistence. It is, however, timelessly an 'existent thing' not completely nonexistent. Ask yourself whether it exists to God, assuming you believe in a God who is timeless - outside of time as opposed to omnipresent in time.

As I have said elsewhere, that is where I have trouble finding a coherent presentation of 'presentism' that is neither equivalent to eternalism nor self evidently false. See this reply to Dr Bonnette.

Apart from anything else, you apparently do accept that the past affects the present. You respond to my messages, and I imagine that if you left food in the fridge in the (recent) past you expect it to be there when you go back, and if it is not you go looking for a reason, i.e. a cause in the (even more recent) past, as to why it is no longer there.

We seem to disagree on a number of things, whether or not an event in the past is absolutely nonexistent in any meaningful sense being one.

It is this point that is primary because if the past still exists then of course it could potentially have an effect on the present.

My view is that the past doesn't truly exist like the present, and therefore can't effect the present.

You never answered why you think position rather than velocity is the quality that remains the same unless actively changed.

I'm perfectly fine with this point. That's why I didn't bring it up.