I am also trying to fit complex thoughts into few words so I understand completely.

I for one fail miserably when it comes to brevity. I applaud you for your much greater success on that score!

I just think we have to keep in mind that He is not quite like anything else we know.

I agree completely. If I remember correctly, Aquinas said something like, "If you understand it then it isn't God."

I didn't think you sounded pedantic. I am also trying to fit complex thoughts into few words so I understand completely.

I agree that we get to know God through the effects of His actions. I just think we have to keep in mind that He is not quite like anything else we know.

Agreed. The friend analogy isn't perfect either and falls short in the way you mentioned and in other ways. Our personhood itself is not identical to God's but is an analogue to it.

The definition of "being" does not include a measure of greatness or superiority either.

Granted. Please see my last post (reply to Michael Murray) in which I attempt to clarify Anselm's argument, which doesn't use notions of perfection per se. My original parody of Anselm's argument was admittedly sloppy. Without reproducing everything, allow me to at least reproduce Anselm's actual argument here:

"In fact, it so undoubtedly exists that it cannot be thought of as not existing. For one can think there exists something that cannot be thought of as not existing, and that would be greater than something which can be thought of as not existing. For if that greater than which cannot be thought can be thought of as not existing, then that greater than which cannot be thought is not that greater than which cannot be thought, which does not make sense. Thus that than which nothing can be thought so undoubtedly exists that it cannot even be thought of as not existing."

So he's not comparing the "greatness" or "superiority" of different things which are known to exist (such as islands) but rather is contemplating the existence of "that than which nothing greater can be thought". Clearly, if "that than which nothing greater can be thought" exists only in our minds then it lacks something it would possess if it also actually existed, and is in that sense greater.

(Sorry, I just "reproduced" more than I intended.)

If Anselm does not consider "godhood" a subset of "being" in general, perhaps he is making a category mistake?

I can't speak for Anselm, but I would agree with Paul F when he states above that God defies classification. I submit that God does not belong to categories per se; he is the very reason that categories exist at all. I cannot imagine how "godhead" could be a subset of anything. It it were a subset, then there would be something greater which contains it, so then how would it be "godhead" at all?

Perhaps the persistent popular notion of God as "supreme being" gets us off track... God is not just the "greatest among many", but rather "that than which nothing greater can be thought". Thus (to paraphrase Bishop Robert Barron) God is fundamentally unlike everything else in creation, because the sum of those things is greater than the parts, but a "best of all existing beings" would be akin to superman, but superman plus an army is greater than superman alone. But God plus the entire universe is not greater than God alone (otherwise, he would not be "that than which nothing greater can be thought"), so we cannot place him in any particular genus of existence with which we are familiar. He is entirely other. He is the necessary and sufficient reason that existence itself exists.

Do you think there is a single argument that works for this purpose?

I think I side with you on this: any individual argument is bound to fall short, so we must take them in the aggregate. At the same time, as I wrote to Paul F:

But I would not discount the value of that knowledge which stems from
reason, for the same God who reveals himself to us as a person also
gives us the gift of reason.

...

Of course, such knowledge does not and can not lead us to a full understanding of God. As Aquinas put it, “it must be said that perfect knowledge of a cause cannot be derived from an effect that is not proportionate to the cause."--Because God is infinite, while his observable effects are finite--"Nevertheless, the existence of the cause
can be demonstrated clearly from the existence of the effects, even though we cannot know the cause perfectly according to its essence.” (Summa Theologica)

I apologize for the breach of etiquette and good taste I commit by quoting myself. ;)

Belief in God is compatible with materialism, but we end with a monist version like that of Spinoza...i.e. God is everything.

I don't follow. Why do you conclude that we end with monism? Acceptance of God's existence based on rational argument alone cannot rule out the God of revelation.

Power ? Does anyone take this argument at all seriously ?

I think you may be overly focused on the word "power" here. If I'd written, "I doubt that a bowling ball could be lifted by the strength of an infant's arm", your response would probably not have been: "Strength? Who thinks that infants are strong?"

But although I did not intend to suggest that my parody of Anselm's argument has any obvious power to convince (hence my assertion that an atheist would not likely be swayed by it), I do personally find something subtly intriguing about it, philosophically if not apologetically.

It doesn't define what a being is nor what superior is or what being more superior than something else is.

In my last post I followed the language of this thread which very loosely used terms like superior and perfection. I also casually (perhaps erroneously?) identified this as Anselm's argument. But for the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that Anselm's argument was based on what is conceivable in the mind, not with what is superior by any particular human measure. He distinguished between what exists only as a concept and what exists both in concept and in actuality. He pointed out that if we conceive of something that exists actually as well as in our mind, it is greater than something which exists in our mind alone. (The one exists in the mind and elsewhere besides; the other exists only in the mind. The former is greater in the sense that is exists in the same way as the latter, but also in another sense in which the latter does not.) He applies this reasoning not to concepts in general, but to "that which cannot be thought not to exist".

Here's his argument without the filter of my explanations: "In fact, it so undoubtedly exists that it cannot be thought of as not existing. For one can think there exists something that cannot be thought of as not existing, and that would be greater than something which can be thought of as not existing. For if that greater than which cannot be thought can be thought of as not existing, then that greater than which cannot be thought is not that greater than which cannot be thought, which does not make sense. Thus that than which nothing can be thought so undoubtedly exists that it cannot even be thought of as not existing."

While I am intrigued by this philosophically, I do not assert that the equating of "something that cannot be thought of as not existing" with God is immediately obvious to everyone. I do subscribe to Anselm's definition of God ("that than which nothing greater can be thought") but admit to our obvious limitations in knowing anything at all about such a God beyond his existence (unless, of course, he reveals truths about himself to us). Thus, the argument does not quite "stand alone"...

What do you mean by a number here ?

I deliberately used imprecise language (mathematically speaking) because 1) I didn't think this was the correct forum for mathematical rigor, and 2) I am positing this example by way of analogy only, and not as any kind of mathematical proof. But if you like, replace the word "number" with "quantity", and notice that even in an infinite sequence each element is finite. The concept of infinity arises in the limit of the series, each element of which is not infinite. The very concept of infinity, then, arises from an endless succession of the finite. In this sense, then, it is a useful analogy to arriving at the concept of God ("that than which nothing greater can be thought") by way of things that themselves are less than God.

Thank you for clearing up your point (and forgive me for being so pedantic in my last reply).

I heartily agree with your sentiment that a distinction should be made between personal and intellectual knowledge of God, and that knowledge of a personal sort is surely paramount.

But I would not discount the value of that knowledge which stems from reason, for the same God who reveals himself to us as a person also gives us the gift of reason. That gift must be of value, if only to inform our will, though I suspect more than that. ("Ever since the creation of the world, his invisible attributes of eternal power and divinity have been able to be understood and perceived in what he has made." Rom 1:20)

Of course, such knowledge does not and can not lead us to a full understanding of God. As Aquinas put it, “it must be said that perfect knowledge of a cause cannot be derived from an effect that is not proportionate to the cause."--Because God is infinite, while his observable effects are finite--"Nevertheless, the existence of the cause can be demonstrated clearly from the existence of the effects, even though we cannot know the cause perfectly according to its essence.” (Summa Theologica)

To build on your example, while I agree that a relationship with a friend is most properly a personal relationship, there is still value in the knowledge that comes from the effects of that relationship. For example, suppose that I know nothing of a friend of yours. You can point to his/her influence in your life (acts of charity, generosity, etc) to give me insight into the character of your friend, and if I happen to be of the opinion that your friend is imaginary you can even point to various effects to convince me of his existence…

But your point is well taken, and I think you are right in pointing out the limitations of mere intellectual knowledge.

I think that God defies even this classification. He is prior even to classification.

Well said.

I realize that my analogies are not perfect, and I anticipated some of your objections. I do not disagree with your objections, but I am not trying to argue against God's existence. I am arguing against trying to know God in the way that proof's try to know Him.

Deductive reasoning works from the general facts to a particular fact. Inductive reasoning works from a particular fact to general facts. In order to know which one to use, we have to know whether God is a particular fact or a general fact.

I think that God defies even this classification. He is prior even to classification. He is in some ways general (omnipresent) and in some ways particular (trinity). We fail when we try to pin God down into a particular mode of existence.

For this reason, I do not think God is meant to be known in the way that we know the facts of the universe. I think He is meant to be known more in the way we know a person.

For example, when you recognize a friend of yours, can you prove that he is the person you recognize him to be? (Forget DNA analysis for this example.) You see his face and you know beyond a shadow of a doubt that he is your friend. You could look at every face of every person who has ever lived and never mistake one of them for your friend. You know your friend. You would never consider trying devise a proof for his existence or tests to verify that he exists. In fact these tests would be degrading to your friend, who would ask, "don't you know me?"

I wouldn't expect an atheist to convert based solely on the power of this argument.

Power ? Does anyone take this argument at all seriously ? It doesn't define what a being is nor what superior is or what being more superior than something else is.

Let's define the concept of infinity as "that number above which no other number can be counted". The concept of the uncountable certainly exists,

What do you mean by a number here ? Because if you mean what people usually mean then it doesn't include ordinals like omega. So there is no number above which no other number can be counted. You can in any case count some of these higher ordinals like omega, omega+1, omega+2 ... so you need to define what count means as well.

EDIT: Sorry I wrote aleph_0 which is strictly speaking a cardinal. I really need aleph_0 more coffee in the mornings before I do transfinite mathematics.

This idea falls to the "perfect island" thought experiment. Any perfect
island you can conceive, there is a more perfect island (adding more
resorts, creatures, amusement parks, ect). Thus the perfect island must
exist, right? Where is it? Just because you can imagine something
better, and there's potentially something better than you can imagine
does not, in any way, imply existence.

The definition of "island" does not include any measure of greatness or superiority. (Perfection is not intrinsic to "island-ness".) A "highly inferior" island, by any standard, is still an island. That is, we do not say it is not an island because we can think of a better one.

But St. Anselm's definition of God ("that than which nothing greater can be conceived") does include the notion of superiority (or perfection). Thus, an inferior sort of god (ie- one that does not exist) logically cannot exist... it is ruled out by its very definition,

It may seem that we've just proven the trivial: a god which doesn't exist cannot exist (given St. Anselm's definition). But what if I replace "God" with "the infinite"? Let's define the concept of infinity as "that number above which no other number can be counted". The concept of the uncountable certainly exists, and is utterly independent upon our evaluation of the relative perfections of other things which can be counted, such as islands.

Here it is clear that I have not simply proved that "that which is not infinite is not infinite". Rather, this reasoning demonstrates that numerical infinity is fundamentally different from everything else we experience precisely because it cannot be counted.

Likewise must God be "understood".

But, all said, I have to side with you in as much as the argument from perfection lacks a certain convincing force. I think it serves well to remind us of God's otherness, but I wouldn't expect an atheist to convert based solely on the power of this argument.

Putting aside for the moment the application of physical scientific
methods to the meta-physical, we should recognize that even science
doesn't work in the purely inductive way you describe.

Eg. we know a black whole exists based on light refraction around it and
the effect of its gravity on surrounding matter. The evidence is too
strong to make any substantive objections to it. However, there is no
real proof that it exists in the sense that one could reason deductively
that it exists.

But the existence of black holes was not merely induced from empirical evidence. It was in fact first deduced theoretically. Observations were then undertaken to support or undermine the theory. Originally it was thought that nature would not allow such singularities (that's still a point of debate in some circles, by the way), and that the absence of such singularities argued against the model. Subsequent observation has thus far vindicated the models.

Of course, it is true that those theoretical predictions came from a model which was itself constructed to match other observations, and was thus at least informed by observational means, but there is a vital element of physical theory which depends as much upon the imagination of the thinker as it does the available evidence. And scientific models come and go. Thus, scientists tend to regard them as temporary approximations.

Einstein's special and general theories of relativity are perfect examples of the theory-before-evidence approach. There was no direct evidence (at the time) to support his hypothesis that space and time are curved. Rather, he imagined a model which could explain a curious prediction of Maxwell's equations: that the speed of light is the same in every reference frame. The observations which support his theories came later.

In order to use deductive reasoning to prove God's existence, God would
have to belong to a genus which is known to exist, and it would have to
be evident that God is a member of that genus.

Such a statement inherently assumes that all existing things must belong to a genus, and thus eliminates the possibility of transcendent realities. It cannot, then, disprove what it eliminates in its own assumptions.

The God of Christianity does not belong to any genus precisely because He is not a "being" in the ordinary sense of the word... not just another thing to be classified and counted. He is, ultimately, that which makes it possible for those things which CAN be counted and classified to exist.

Suppose that we are just brains in vats, or embedded in "the Matrix". Would our inability to induce the existence of the vat or the matrix by means of observation within the vat or matrix invalidate claims of the existence of vat or matrix?

Truth can at some times be deduced, at other times induced, and at still other times be revealed. (Red pill or blue, Neo.)

By the way, we also do not observe countable occurrences of the square root of -1 in nature, but imaginary numbers have proved very powerful in mathematical analysis.