- 'Every Natural' allows one to discard any example that is inconvenient to the argument, which is a form of the 'no true scotsman' fallacy. An Atheist could easily claim that God is not a 'natural' desire. Indeed, the very argument for god's existence is contingent upon him being 'supernatural'

2.) "But there exists in us a desire which nothing in time, nothing on earth, no creature can satisfy."

-'a desire' implies that all humans have a desire for a god, which is demonstrably false with the existence of Gnostic Atheists. There are many desires for such things which can not or have not been proven to exist. Magic, Ghosts, the Afterlife, Karma, Luck, fictional devices a plethora. (which should not be dismissed using the 'natural clause')

3.) "Therefore there must exist something more than time, earth, and creatures, which can satisfy this desire."

- Premise 3 is assumed here, it has not been proven in any way. I think this is the weakest point in the argument, for it demands to be proven false, without first being proven true. As we all know, proving a claim false which is vaguely defined and is apt to discard inconvenient rebuttals is a futile endeavor, you can try ad nauseum and the proponent will just discard any good example.

4.) "This something is what people call "God" and "life with God forever.""

-4 may be taken as the conclusion, and my first rebuttal is that it does not logically follow the premises unless you assume it is already in fact, true. It implies that aforementioned desire of god specifically is universally innate, which is false, Or it demands that any desire which you can not relate to the natural world must be 'god' by definition. And that last part is wholly unproven, it is merely declared.

I believe this to be one of the least clever arguments I have read. It is summed up as
"I desire god,
things that I desire that are real, are in fact real,
Since god is real and I desire god, that is the proof"

For it is only true so far as you place god in the 'real' category. You have to already believe in god in order to believe the argument.

Well, "evolution" is just the "science of the gaps" isn't it? We start with simple axioms like "food helps survival so organisms like food" but with human beings we desire meaning - which unless you can really describe what went on, as in, explain how A follows B other than saying "evolution" did it, it is the same as saying "God did it." It's not a scientific argument, it's a guess based on a philosophical presumption.

Your revised version is the correct argument. The original argument just assumes the conclusion.

Maybe I'm missing something, but doesn't premise 1 assume the conclusion? The real argument seems to be that (1) there exists in us a desire which nothing in time, nothing on earth, no creature can satisfy; (2) every other natural, innate desire in us corresponds to some real object that can satisfy that desire; (3) we have no reason to make an exception in the case of (1); (4) therefore there must exist something more than time, earth, and creatures, which can satisfy this desire; and so (5) this something is what people call "God" and "life with God forever."

I don't actually agree with premise 2 of the revised argument (premise 1 in the original), but I can stipulate it for the sake of discussion and still dispute premise 3. I think there is good reason to believe there can be at least one exception to the rule that for all our natural, innate desires, there exist real things that can satisfy them.

First of all, please understand that my recognition of what I called your superior understanding, 'obviously' springs from some kind of lack of confidence. I was brought up for being condescending because of the same failing. I shall do better, hopefully, in the future, and trust that no apology on my part is necessary, because I should rather trust that the criticism/critique of others will make clear any lack in my argument.

With respect to the a priori, I am still attempting to understand he difference of how this is treated in Thomistic philosophy in contrast to the philosophies of modernism. I understand, for one thing, that theological ideas of God are made on the basis of analogy. (and revelation?!!!). I also understand that the deductive logic of Aristotle is used, but in an example I met with, I found that the definition given was somewhat tautological, and thus possibly empty. So what is meant by a priori in this regard is still somewhat vague to my understanding.

As mentioned, I 'know' that Kant based his categories on Aristotelean logic and that these serve for parameters for the 'understanding'. By a priori he simply means that the conceptual basis is primary in the cases of attaining empirical evidence, (in science, etc.) He thus places reason 'a priori' to 'experience'.

I also understand that there can be some difficulty when a priori judgments are made without reference to experience, and I am not talking here about allusions to God. There is just a tendency in analysis of concepts to go from one to another, through substitution and other techniques, and that this tendency, (inherent in language I believe) has to be made conscious. It is one of the reasons, however, which accounts for the fact that no two philosophers seem to agree, but which also may be the basis for the 'development' of ideas.

No need to respond. I do understand some of the implications of Kant's 'Copernican revolution'. I also think that it is responsible for the development of proposition logic. I will make no apologies, but please know that one of the reasons I am on this site, is to explore the difference in these worldviews because I 'really' do not understand the implications. .I do know that Bertrand Russel criticized Thomistic logic for being too 'top down'. So it seems that the modern world relies more on induction, (propositional logic?) and not the deductive a priori basis identified with Aristotle. . I wonder also whether there is a possibility of reconciliation, by an analysis of where each method is most fruitful and/or necessary. With respect to the world I believe Aristotle's viewpoint is considered to be a 'naive realism'. I also don't believe there is any other way of doing theology except through analogy, which is difficult for me to square with the basis of the a priori. .

Please don’t say superior judgment and ability. That
would indicate my failure to communicate my view. Rather than Kant’s categories, through which reality must be filtered, I would recognize (in accord with what I perceive to be the perennial philosophy of Aristotle) just two self-evident
principles. Through these our power to think conforms to reality, not vice versa, which is my interpretation of Kant’s view. By a self-evident principle I mean one which, if denied, eliminates the possibility of all knowledge and communication. These are: (1) Things exist and (2) Everything makes sense. (It is the inherent intelligibility of material entities, which is the most profound principle of the perennial philosophy.) Our knowledge starts with our
immediate experience of things by which we know their intelligible natures. We can only ask if a being exists, if we already know its nature from prior experience of its existence or the existence of an entity of the same nature. We are merely asking if one of that nature exists now. At the initiation of a philosophical inquiry, we cannot ask, “Does God exist?” because nothing within our experience, i.e. no entity whose nature we know through experience, is ‘God’. Any definition that we could initiate as that of a natural entity would in fact be merely a logical construct within the confines of our experience, often just a cut and paste image. In other words we cannot originate an a priori definition of any entity.

Quote: (Sins of the flesh, i.e. original sin would be equated with) "the preservation of the self, the gratification of the self, the aggrandizement of the self"

In reference to the discussion in the last post about virtue being a response to either adversity or attraction, (as in Buddhism also) l. courage could be a virtuous means of achieving a preservation of the self; 2. self-control, i.e. control of the self could be a virtuous response to the desires for excess in pleasure, and 3. aggrandizement could describe in general the vices that spring from 'Desire'. Original sin in this context could be compared to being immersed, in the Buddhist terminology, within the wheels of suffering, samsara, . In Buddhism Karma is the result of a 'cosmic?' law whereas in Christianity we are directly responsible for such limitation. Interesting.

N.B. I googled sin, esp. original sin. It's not as simple as I had thought nor is the idea held universally..

Proofs are determined through logical reasoning. The 'proof is in the pudding' hypothesis, i.e. neurological empirical evidence of desire alone, I feel is not sufficient in this case because there is also 'no 'external' evidence' of what the object of my desire might be. God could turn out to be the devil for all we know!!!! This argument therefore, is without a 'rational' basis of sound argument or reasoning: i.e. it is without the "Logic" required of a proof.
(Please correct "my'' logic,etc. if I am in error. I am attempting to learn the rules and method of debate. Thanks guys).

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I had accepted the priority you mentioned of theology as the basis of 'desire' for 'God?'. I did this on the basis of Kant placing the epistemological structure of knowledge, at least, on the a priori categories, which themselves are derived from Aristotle's logic. I thus 'reasoned', that if there was an a priori (i.e. reason) as the basis of any desire for God, that it would no longer be based on an ego-eccentricity. For one thing, (Kant again) it would have to conform to such notions as universality and necessity, as does his deontological proof.
Anyway that's the basis of my difficulty in accepting a proof which seems to be based merely on a desire which excludes reason. The neurological basis would then just be adding another experiential element to the proposed evidence of a 'natural' desire within humanity.
The latest post explores humanity in relation to angels and 'beasts'. That argument seems to be part of the continuity I have found in the previous post as well as this one. In that regard I am not prepared to equate my 'understanding' with either. P.S. I appreciate your helpfulness in this regard, as I recognize your superior judgment and ability. Thanks.

That's OK.! I write for the main purpose of clarifying and increasing my understanding.