This would be based upon ones ability to use the methodology of the study of philosophy to a extraordinary degree, and also has a vast knowledge of the field. Pretty much like anymore would judge someone who is good in their field--a talented scientist would be one who is skilled in using the methods of whatever field of science they are in, and has a vast knowledge of that field.

he is, in my humble opinion, one of the most talented philosophers of our day.(

Based on what ? Prizes, awards, recognition of his peers, your own knowledge of the field ?

This is a serious question about how you make such a judgement across the whole enormous field of philosophy ?

Sure, Phil. And, approach it from the stance that you and I are not disputing destinations, only designating the route we must have traveled. For, you see, we are all born with common sense and have traveled a distance to arrive at certain positions regarding reality. Many know WHAT they believe but have difficulty articulating WHY it's justified. It's like they got to their destination in the same vehicle as you and I, except that they were locked in the trunk, while, due to curiosity and self-critique, we were blessed to be riding in the back seat, looking out the window, while Aquinas and GK Chesterton took turns driving, Common sense, combined with faith, is the destination. Any who use this approach can be epistemically competent, but most seem to be unconsciously competent to a degree. Some study philosophy and get stupider than they were before, for with logic being such a powerful vehicle, starting with an empty concept or faulty premise, the world's greatest logicians can get further from the truth, faster and more efficiently, than any poor imbecile could ever dare to aspire.

My contention towards this would be that if it would be ultimately incoherent to believe that a "property" (especially a metaphysical property) of the whole would not be the same as the parts, one could conclude, metaphysically, that the part and whole share this same property.

Not clear to me that we're talking about the same thing. I'm thinking of Aristotelian saying that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, in the context, for example of an emergentist heuristic, where novel properties emerge, unpredictability, from the combination of constituent parts, sometimes. We don't need metaphysical thought experiments, just physics, chemistry, biology and consciousness to illustrate the notion.

Thank you for writing this drawn out response. It helps a lot to get at exactly what you are saying! (I plan to read over it again to reflect on the things I didn't pick up on the first time.)

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My first thought is that I agree with you completely that we should be wary of accepting things with strong conviction that we simply say are "self-evident".

As I have hinted at before, my main contention would be that if a position cannot be coherently defended and held, I see no reason to give this position any real merit over the alternative position (or another alternative position) that is coherent and can be rationally defended.

For example, take these two positions:
(a) The human intellect cannot come to any objective truth about reality. (i.e., complete skepticism is true)
(b) The human intellect can come to, at least some, objective truths about reality.

These are the only two options we have. I would hold that in position (a) cannot be coherently defended, while position (b) can. This puts us in a very good position to declare with great certainty that (b) is the actual truth of reality.

Once we do that, any other position that we might take about reality that would rationally lead us to conclude that complete skepticism is true (i.e., position (a)) would have serious doubts as its own validity as a true statement about reality.

Anyway, just some thoughts.

There's no escaping, seems to me, that our ontological posits precede our epistemological musings.

Our methodological parlors already come well appointed with a veritable suite of metaphysical furnishings. We could say they are non-acquisitional because we don't have to go shopping for them. Philosophically, we could say they are non-propositional because we don't have to prove them. I suspect this all matches what Polkinghorne meant in epistemology models ontology.

Too many philosophical "schools" seem to me to be on metaphysical shopping sprees, unaware that their methodological parlors are already divinely appointed (double entendre intended, use merriam webster definitions 1.a. and/or 2.a. per one's own a/theologic disposition).

An economically minded, common sensical phenomenology enters the parlor and takes an inventory of such furnishings as possibilities, actualities and probabilities, describes their features, like noncontradiction, excluded middle, identity, uniformities and nonuniformities, and, perhaps, may even notice the existence of other tenants (let's call them minds.

An astute tenant will properly gather that these furnishings are not only incredibly sturdy but happen to be priceless, time-honored antiques. They not only needn't be acquired, already being furnished, but they best not be disposed of and needn't be replaced as they've already proved their worth.

As with any old building, which has gone through many owners and tenants, we will come across old paperwork, such as inventories of furnishings, which may even be written in other languages, interpreting the nature of this piece or that, describing it this way or that. For example, take the uniformities lanterns, which light up the dim corners of the parlor. Some inventory-takers have suggested these uniformities are necessitarian, law-like and prescriptive in operation (adverting to nomicity), while others have suggested they are descriptive regularities. Most have called them by their colloquial name, causes. Whether the lanterns work because of nomicity or regularity needn't be resolved as long as they throw off sufficient light.

Again, as with any old building, there will have been furnishings brought in that just don't "fit" or don't function and could be removed, even best be removed.

Gotcha, I just see no way to uphold the human person's ability to come to truth about reality, without at the same time holding that if only two positions are available and one is actually incoherent, then the alternative must be true. If one can't do that, it seems like the human person is trust into a complete skepticism where objective truth no longer exists.

.

Skepticism, regarding this or that piece of furniture, needn't be interpreted as a thoroughgoing attitude toward the entire suite. In fact, it may only take the form --- not whether a furnishing should be dispensed with, and not even whether or not it is useful, but --- of skepticism regarding how it works (e.g. nomicity versus regularity).

The reason I suggested caution in appealing to the self-evident in not because we cannot be very reasonably assured that there are invaluable, even indispensable, metaphysical furnishings already provided, a veritable complete set even, but, because isolated pieces in inventory really don't belong, for one reason or another. We cannot walk into that parlor and a priori say
that every furnishing necessarily has the same metaphysical vintage and methodological legacy as the others but it would be silly to deny that the entire suite thereby necessarily lacks value.

So, we don't reason infallibly from a given metaphysical presupposition (furnishing) of our methodological stipulations (parlor) to an ontological necessity (it necessarily belongs to the suite), but it would be intuitively absurd and manifestly impracticable to deny that most of those furnishings very probably belong in that suite.

There don't seem to me to be only two positions available, naive realism vs radical skepticism. No one is forced to argue that ALL of the furnishings must EITHER remain OR get tossed. One of the chief problems in metaphysical schools is not the supposed under-appreciation of the principle of noncontradiction, as so many imagine, but the over-application of excluded middle.

Thus, when it comes to that third modal category beyond possibilities and actualities, or potentialities and acts, what Scotus called the formal distinction and Peirce called thirdness, we prescind from necessity to probability, keeping noncontradiction, setting aside excluded middle. And as phenomenologists understand, the logic of this modal category works, pragmatically, indispensably even, should one aspire to evade absurdity, even as essentialists and nominalists debate nomicity vs regularity accounts of reality's uniformities.

Bottom line:

philosophically, faith in reality's rationality is not a syllogism but a justified belief ...

theologically, faith in God is not a syllogism but a justified belief ...

Faith is way under-rated in philosophical parlors.
Syllogistic arguments are way over-rated in theological parlors.

At least, that's the way I uphold the human person's ability to come to truth about reality. It's called common sense. I never took a philosophy course in my life. Most of it sounds like total poppycock to me, which I have read about and studied and then have deployed mostly in an effort to demonstrate how it all subverts from within. Phenomenology studies the modal and logical structure of common sense, heralds its strengths, trumpets its limitations and recognizes faith's indispensable role in everyday life.

That's my attempt to more accessibly unpack my dense prose per your polite request. Not sure I succeeded, as it's not a gift but a challenge I still struggle with.

Some wholes can be explained by looking at the individual explanations of their parts and some can't. We don't know which type of explanation would suffice for reality writ large because we don't which type of whole it is.

My contention towards this would be that if it would be ultimately incoherent to believe that a "property" (especially a metaphysical property) of the whole would not be the same as the parts, one could conclude, metaphysically, that the part and whole share this same property.

So, again, to hold that something, which is incoherent, is actually true would seem to thrust the human person back into a complete state of skepticism (which I don't think can be defended as being actually true.)

Gotcha, I just see no way to uphold the human person's ability to come to truth about reality, without at the same time holding that if only two positions are available and one is actually incoherent, then the alternative must be true. If one can't do that, it seems like the human person is trust into a complete skepticism where objective truth no longer exists.

If it is likely that the universe is transient instead of permanent, that would reinforce its sense of purpose not weaken it, even from a materialist point of view.

A universe ending after widespread consciousness and self-understanding had been achieved would be far more deemed to have existed for that purpose than a universe which lasts forever. A universe lasting forever would be deemed to exist for nothing other than merely existing.

That's fascinating. It would still mean the ultimate fate of the universe isn't a state of self-awareness/however you like to word it.