You'll simply have to forgive my bad grammar, punctuation, etc. eek

Sorry for the delayed response Quine (I like the name btw; Willard Quine is one of my favorite philosophers)

RE: Swinburne's reply reminds me, very much, of the "Irreducible Complexity" arguments made by the I.D. movement. I have re-labeled this as "Irrefutable Perplexity" because is embodies the idea: "What I say is true because you can't show it isn't, and what you say is false because, I can't understand it."

Swinburne denies (though I can't speak for him) 'irreducible complexity' insofar as it does not explain adaptive traits as well as the Darwinian explanation. At first blush it could be that Swinburne's view (i.e., the soul can serve as an explanation for thoughts, feelings, etc) is analogous to 'irreducible complexity'. Upon closer inspection it fails. Why? Irreducible complexity is competing with our best scientific evidence with regards to adaptions (it isn't necessary that we discuss which one best explains adaptions but I confident in the Darwinian one). Swinburne's view that the soul explains why we have thoughts, feeling, etc. does not compete with our best scientific evidence in the way irreducible complexity does. Substance dualism is not competing with our best scientific evidence. In fact, I'd be surprised to meet a single Substance dualist who challenged our best scientific evidence. Now, you might respond with something like 'well Tim even if Substance Dualism is not competing with our best scientific evidence, it certainly isn't supported by it. You are just wandering into speculative error Tim, and you shouldn't do that!!" I'll let you pick up there if you'd like though.

RE: "Emergent Complexity"

I should have said Emergentism (reductive physicalism or non-reductive physicalism), which is the philosophical view that the mind is an emergent property of lower level brain activity, and can (i.e., reductive physicalism) or cannot (i.e., non-reductive physicalism) be reduced to lower level brain activity. There could probably be cases where Emergentism and Dualism (e.g., Property Dualism) are compatible. I still think these views would be lacking with regards to what causes mental events though. Saying that mental events have properties that cannot be reduced to (or are not identical) to physical properties is separate from what *actually* causes those mental events, right?

RE: "How?"

Consider *I* as referring to the person/soul. I agree with Swinburne that *I* is the best explanation for why I have thoughts and feelings. *I* cannot be reduced to, nor is *I* identical to the physical brain.

You'll simply have to forgive my bad grammar, punctuation, etc. eek

Sorry for the delayed response Quine (I like the name btw; Willard Quine is one of my favorite philosophers)

RE: Swinburne's reply reminds me, very much, of the "Irreducible Complexity" arguments made by the I.D. movement. I have re-labeled this as "Irrefutable Perplexity" because is embodies the idea: "What I say is true because you can't show it isn't, and what you say is false because, I can't understand it."

Swinburne denies (though I can't speak for him) 'irreducible complexity' insofar as it does not explain adaptive traits as well as the Darwinian explanation. At first blush it could be that Swinburne's view (i.e., the soul can serve as an explanation for thoughts, feelings, etc) is analogous to 'irreducible complexity'. Upon closer inspection it fails. Why? Irreducible complexity is competing with our best scientific evidence with regards to adaptions (it isn't necessary that we discuss which one best explains adaptions but I confident in the Darwinian one). Swinburne's view that the soul explains why we have thoughts, feeling, etc. does not compete with our best scientific evidence in the way irreducible complexity does. Substance dualism is not competing with our best scientific evidence. In fact, I'd be surprised to meet a single Substance dualist who challenged our best scientific evidence. Now, you might respond with something like 'well Tim even if Substance Dualism is not competing with our best scientific evidence, it certainly isn't supported by it. You are just wandering into speculative error Tim, and you shouldn't do that!!" I'll let you pick up there if you'd like though.

RE: "Emergent Complexity"

I should have said Emergentism (reductive physicalism or non-reductive physicalism), which is the philosophical view that the mind is an emergent property of lower level brain activity, and can (i.e., reductive physicalism) or cannot (i.e., non-reductive physicalism) be reduced to lower level brain activity. There could probably be cases where Emergentism and Dualism (e.g., Property Dualism) are compatible. I still think these views would be lacking with regards to what causes mental events though. Saying that mental events have properties that cannot be reduced to (or are not identical) to physical properties is separate from what *actually* causes those mental events, right?

RE: "How?"

Consider *I* as referring to the person/soul. I agree with Swinburne that *I* is the best explanation for why I have thoughts and feelings. *I* cannot be reduced to, nor is *I* identical to the physical brain.

How do you know? Why is there no real evidence that science can test? Shouldn't real things be distinguishable from misperceptions via scientific testing?

Really? And how do you know this?

The mind performs mental activities. It works through the body which acts as the hands, legs and mouthpiece for the mind. The mind is alive even after the body ceases to function. Many thousands will attest to this fact.

Every individual human is a soul of which the body is the tangible, visible part.

God created the natural environment with its actions and reactions which are reliable.

If I stretch a piece of thin wire across a cycle path and someone rides through it and garrottes themselves I'm the murderer. Likewise if as you claim God creates the natural environment and the children are victims of the natural environment created by God then ...