Hello William, I know that this is an older post but I just came across (only coming here infrequently). I thought that this link would interest you:
http://sulcus.berkeley.edu/wjf/CR%20FreemanAquinas.pdf

how is it possible that the matter/energy of your brain becomes the
immaterial concept of "procrastination" when you are thinking about it?

I would deny that this is a valid question. The material brain does not become the immaterial concept of procastination by thinking about it.

If it can be reasoned that there is no way to account for this fact without also positing that the thing
that is thinking about the immaterial concept of "procrastination" is
also immaterial, then that is the rational conclusion to come to.

What is the reasoning?

We started with the question: how is it possible that the matter/energy of your brain becomes the immaterial concept of "procrastination" when you are thinking about it?

If it can be reasoned that there is no way to account for this fact without also positing that the thing that is thinking about the immaterial concept of "procrastination" is also immaterial, then that is the rational conclusion to come to.

Now, if a person wants to dispute this claim, they will have to explain how the material brain becomes the immaterial concept as you are thinking about it. A hylomorphic realist, like myself, would say that this is impossible and the closest one can get to this is by proposing some sort of magical interaction between the material and the immaterial, similar to Descartes (which in the end, magic really explains nothing).

The trouble is people are so completely stuck in a materialistism vs. dualism type of view, and they completely miss that there is a middle option (which Pat Schultz has been presenting). This middle option solves most every major issue that arises from those two. Why people seem to hold that implicit assumption that this view of reality is false, I don't know. It truly is an amazing modern myth.

Thousands of years, yes, have you read any current research? You see, because YOU are conceiving of things in very anthropocentric terms.

I still don't see why I should believe that material things cannot interact with immaterial things.

A more general statement would be that if X interacts with Y then X and why belong to the same category. This is obviously false. For instance, solid potassium can react with liquid water, therefore we know that a solid can interact with a liquid. So you have to give an argument for why immaterial things only interact with other immaterial things - it cannot be assumed outright, because unlike things interact all of the time.

Can immaterial things interact with material things?

Why should I not believe that concepts are not the product of material things? Or that materiality is prior to immateriality?

I could also deny the existence of universals. I feel like Thomistic claims are laden with unsupported and evidenced assumptions.

There is a big difference between perceiving and conceiving.

Agreed, Phil. And it's not just quantitative.

From a semiotic perspective for those who'd like to dig further -
Animals and humans share homologous instincts, which have an implicit abductive logic that's generative of behavioral plasticity or practical options via syntactical and semantical sign usage, but which otherwise remains unconscious, nonreflective.

Human abductive inference analogously employs an explicit abductive logic
that's also evaluative of behavioral options, both practically and speculatively
via --- not only syntactical and semantical, but --- symbolic sign usage, combining unconscious, nonreflective, abductive instinct with conscious, reflective, hence robustly intentional, abductive inference.

For concrete examples, Google the syntax: abductive instinct
This hypothesis competes with other views, so, I don't represent it as the final word but only as my own sneaking suspicion, which suspects --- not just quantitative, but qualitative -- continuities and discontinuities between animal and human intelligence, whatever stance one otherwise takes in the philosophy of mind.

Not at all, there is a big difference between perceiving and conceiving. So the way that an animal that perceives expressed itself will be very different from an animal that is also capable of conceiving. Hence, why we see such a big difference between the actions and language of humans and all other non-human animals.

I'll just wrap up this discussion by suggesting a couple books that did a good job making this distinction that I'd recommend checking out:

"In Defense of the Soul" -Ric Machuga
"The Wonder of the World" -Varghese
"Christian Faith and Human Understanding" -Sokolowski

The dream is an image created by the mind.

I think you are artificially constructing a barrier here.

A dream is an image or perception. Non-human animals are great at perceiving; sometimes better than we are!

So non-human animals can perceive, they simply can't conceive. To reaffirm, there is no image tied to the concept of "procrastination". We can describe it through an instance of procrastination, but the concept itself is immaterial.