极速赛车168官网 Comments on: The Ethics of Lying: One Humanist’s View https://strangenotions.com/the-ethics-of-lying/ A Digital Areopagus // Reason. Faith. Dialogue. Sat, 04 Mar 2017 03:44:00 +0000 hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.7.1 极速赛车168官网 By: Doug Shaver https://strangenotions.com/the-ethics-of-lying/#comment-174591 Sat, 04 Mar 2017 03:44:00 +0000 http://strangenotions.com/?p=3613#comment-174591 In reply to Jim (hillclimber).

3. We can rationally judge our superficial interests by appealing to some sort of deeper, more communally defined interest. (That's a bit vague, but I'm fine with some ambiguity; if you want to make that more precise, please do.)

I'm OK with some vagueness. I think humanity's ethical instincts are still evolving, and so nobody should claim to have worked out an ethical moral code in complete detail.

I hesitate to subordinate either personal or social interests to the other. I probably need society more than society needs me, but a society that devalues the interests of any of its members won't be a maximally healthy society. There will be conflicts, but they need to judged case by case.

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极速赛车168官网 By: Jim (hillclimber) https://strangenotions.com/the-ethics-of-lying/#comment-174526 Fri, 03 Mar 2017 14:55:00 +0000 http://strangenotions.com/?p=3613#comment-174526 In reply to Doug Shaver.

Yeah, I agree with that, as long as "interests" is sufficiently caveated.

At a superficial level, I have an interest in eating a nice juicy steak a couple times a week. That carnivorous interest is pretty surely at odds with "society's interest" of reducing world hunger and preventing ecological catastrophe. Of course, at a deeper level, I share those "societal interests", and I think it makes sense to judge my superficial interests by appealing to my deeper interests. Would you agree with that?

If so, I think the chain of command is shaping up along the lines of:

1. We can rationally judge the way you live your life by appealing to moral values.
2. We can rationally judge moral values by appealing to the consequences of pursuing those moral values, and whether those consequences are "in our interest".
3. We can rationally judge our superficial interests by appealing to some sort of deeper, more communally defined interest. (That's a bit vague, but I'm fine with some ambiguity; if you want to make that more precise, please do.)

So if we are nearing then end of the line, then what is the nature of this deeper, more communally defined interest? Does this deeper societal interest correspond in any way to the neo-Platonic transcendentals of truth, love, justice, beauty, being?

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极速赛车168官网 By: Doug Shaver https://strangenotions.com/the-ethics-of-lying/#comment-174521 Fri, 03 Mar 2017 09:41:00 +0000 http://strangenotions.com/?p=3613#comment-174521 In reply to Jim (hillclimber).

The interests of society are inseparable from my own interests.

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极速赛车168官网 By: Jim (hillclimber) https://strangenotions.com/the-ethics-of-lying/#comment-174489 Thu, 02 Mar 2017 22:46:00 +0000 http://strangenotions.com/?p=3613#comment-174489 In reply to Doug Shaver.

OK, so we can judge the way that you live your life by appealing to moral values, and we can judge those moral values by appealing to the happiness that results when those values are pursued. In that case it sounds to me like the ultimate arbiter of the way that you live your life is you, since you are best able to assess your own happiness. Or do we need to appeal to some sort of collective societal happiness?

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极速赛车168官网 By: Doug Shaver https://strangenotions.com/the-ethics-of-lying/#comment-174488 Thu, 02 Mar 2017 22:17:00 +0000 http://strangenotions.com/?p=3613#comment-174488 In reply to Jim (hillclimber).

Aren't our moral values themselves based on judgements?

In my worldview, our moral values are themselves just judgments.

Can't those judgements themselves be wrong?

We do or don't value certain things and we live our lives accordingly. The result will be a certain quality of life. If we find the quality of our lives unsatisfactory we should consider the possibility that we need to change our values. I think it's illogical to value things that make us unhappy.

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极速赛车168官网 By: Michael Murray https://strangenotions.com/the-ethics-of-lying/#comment-174479 Thu, 02 Mar 2017 20:53:00 +0000 http://strangenotions.com/?p=3613#comment-174479 In reply to Lazarus.

So we just need to maintain a good GPA = God Prayer Average ?

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极速赛车168官网 By: Jim (hillclimber) https://strangenotions.com/the-ethics-of-lying/#comment-174478 Thu, 02 Mar 2017 20:44:00 +0000 http://strangenotions.com/?p=3613#comment-174478 In reply to Doug Shaver.

[We appeal to] our moral values

Aren't our moral values themselves based on judgements? Can't those judgements themselves be wrong? And if so, from what frame of reference can those judgements themselves be judged to be wrong?

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极速赛车168官网 By: Doug Shaver https://strangenotions.com/the-ethics-of-lying/#comment-174474 Thu, 02 Mar 2017 19:29:00 +0000 http://strangenotions.com/?p=3613#comment-174474 In reply to Jim (hillclimber).

That is a pretty clear articulation of "might makes right", is it not?

I can understand why it might seem so, but no, I don’t believe it is. It would be “might makes right” if I were claiming that whatever decision was reached by the prevailing party was always the right decision, but I’m not claiming that.

Legality does not have to imply moral acceptability.

Right, that's why your comments about constitutionality seem irrelevant, unless there is some sort of analogy that you can create here.

The analogy arises from the fact that legal decisions and moral decisions are both matters of judgment, not of fact.

We can rationally argue against laws by appealing to the Constitution

But the argument is over how the Constitution should be interpreted, and a matter of interpretation is a matter of judgment.

We can rationally argue that a state of affairs is immoral by appealing to ... what?

To our moral values. If we believe human life has moral value, then we will judge certain states of affairs to be morally unacceptable and others to be morally unacceptable. Likewise, if we believe that any diminution of human suffering has moral value, then we will judge certain states of affairs to be morally unacceptable, but if we believe that certain kinds of human suffering have moral value, then we will judge some of those same states of affairs to be morally acceptable.

Or is there no rational way to argue that a state of affairs is immoral, and we just call things immoral when they don't correspond to the opinions of "whichever person or group has the power, in case of any disagreement, to make their judgment prevail over anyone else’s judgment"

I have my own criteria for judging the moral acceptability of any state of affairs, and in general those criteria make no reference to the opinions of people in power.

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极速赛车168官网 By: Lazarus https://strangenotions.com/the-ethics-of-lying/#comment-174471 Thu, 02 Mar 2017 17:45:00 +0000 http://strangenotions.com/?p=3613#comment-174471 In reply to Doug Shaver.

I know that we both seek truth, with different current assessments.

The existence of God is, in my view, the ultimate mystery, the biggest question we can ask, regardless of our answer.

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极速赛车168官网 By: Lazarus https://strangenotions.com/the-ethics-of-lying/#comment-174470 Thu, 02 Mar 2017 17:43:00 +0000 http://strangenotions.com/?p=3613#comment-174470 In reply to David Nickol.

Maybe hell is empty. Maybe we get graded on a curve.

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