It has always been their contention that man is not unique and requires no divine spark to exist. Ergo, we can envision the creation of conscious artificial entities. These entities, like us, would be subject to a sensory dataset which in their case we would control. We would fully define their perception of the universe. The implication is that a simulated reality is simply real to the one or more entities that it contains.

So Dawkins is faced with a choice. If consciousness can be (will be?) created then there are 'small g' gods out there - pimply faced, in a lab coat, etc. Otherwise the human essence is forever ineffable and we are more directly and intimately linked to an ultimate God who had a hand in creating it all. Either way, there is the need to acknowledge at least some form of higher power which directly conflicts with his world view.

Being a computer simulation does open up interesting/weird possibilities such as having our lives unknowingly reset to play through key events over and over, non-random 'acts of God', time travel, teleportation and other 'miracles', software upgrades, paradigm shifts in reality (heaven/hell), etc.

Unfortunately, having watched my son play video games, it is not clear that the inhabitants of the game would necessarily each have purpose nor can they necessarily intuit the rules for 'winning' - whatever that may be. For that matter, not all of us need to be fully sentient but that way quickly leads to solipsism.

For now, I feel that the verruca deity is a concept that can't be easily refuted but I feel that it remains an interesting thought experiment at best.

I agree that the "pimply teenager" analogy is at best not serious. But why the "simulation within a simulation"? The world which we call physical could be a simulation within the real, ultimate reality. However we view this world, if it's not the ultimate (say, "spiritual" or "the ultimate reality of consciousness") reality, it is a simulation. In essence, any non-ultimate reality is a virtual reality. So, if God creates this sort of simulations, then either he doesn't want us in his ultimate reality, or it is somehow naturally inaccessible for anyone but God, i.e. simulations are necessary. Or, if the ultimate reality is accessible, then these simulations must be training polygons (or "games") for certain purposes.

Kant: physical intuitions are: space time, and the universe.
Kant: intellectual intuitions: or what he calls -The Ideas. are: Freedom, Immortality and God. (Two corresponding categories).

Just making a correlation between the empirical and the transcendental 'ideas'. within the concepts he gives in the Critique.

Solipsism makes absolutely no sense at all. Not only is it illogical but it's also stupid and irrational.

What are you talking about. Def not physics or philosophy for that matter. I think you're confused.

I think that's the exact opposite of what I'm claiming. Obviously we can't currently simulate consciousness, we don't have close to the knowledge or the technology required. And I've been arguing from the start that we don't know that a simulation of consciousness can't be conscious (sorry about the double negative; what I mean is, I'm not saying a simulation would necessarily be conscious but I'm negating the claim that it necessarily wouldn't be; i.e I'm arguing the negation of the claim you just attributed to me).

If you believe a simulation wouldn't be conscious because you don't think consciousness is computable that's completely sensible (though I don't find that particular abstract convincing; they deplore lossy integration for leading to memory damage over time, which I'm pretty sure is how memory actually works... Heck, memory retention and fidelity is one task that computers beat us on easily); it's also a step back from what I was responding to, which was that you "didn't really see how" simulated entities could be sentient. Or do you mean that you don't see how consciousness could be computable either?

"I don't know where you get this idea that we can "consider" irrational numbers and computers can't."
I didnt say that, but where does anyone get any ideas? Where do you get the idea that a computer can handle an irrational number?

"Certainly neither can fit an infinity of decimal places in their memory."
Humans (some at least) can actually think about irrational numbers, and we have an idea of infinitude or enlessness in the first place which is required for thinking about irrational numbers. There is no corresponding capability in a computer. Computers are limited strictly to numbers which are rational, and within lower and upper limits. There are no such limits for humans.

"It's not even an intrinsic part of our nature to know irrational numbers exist - that had to be discovered via mathematical proof."
Mathematical proofs are possible to humans because of something intrinsic to our nature. The fact that we can do mathematical proofs says something about us.

"And computers are already able to validate mathematical proofs, which is what you do when you're first taught about irrational numbers."
You dont need to "validate" something you have proven. I am not sure what you are referring to.

"The only part that computers currently can't do is come up with the proof in the first place, but neither can most humans."
The fact that one human can do something which computers cannot possibly do, would be evidence that that human is not a computer-simulated human.

Are you claiming that we can simulate consciousness, but that a simulation could not be conscious?

I am not a dualist. I don't think consciousness is computable.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.0126

I'm not talking about simulating the Universe, or of us being in a simulation. You're saying you don't think a simulation could be sentient, which is a completely different matter. If we can simulate consciousness then we can set that consciousness in a simulated Universe different from our own, or similar but not identical. They're completely different issues.

As for how a string of ones and zeros can be sentient, how can a set of activation potentials be sentient? Or are you a dualist, in which case: why does an immaterial soul need meat to be attached to? If it's going to be tied to something material you have no idea what the constraints on what that material thing has to be like are.

You seem to still be hung up on the idea of static data in memory, when whatever sentience there is would consist of the changes in that data over time.