"Every x has a(t least 1) y." requires less assumptions than "Every x has (no more than) 1 y.". While the former merely supposes there is some number of y for every x, the latter specifies that number too and makes it identical for every y. The latter reading requires one to demonstrate that the number of y is not 0, 2, 3, 4, 13, 666, 42,199457for any x at all, while the former is falsified by non-y for for some x... Ockham's razor gives us thus non-zero causes rather than one cause as the simple option...

Syllogism Usage
There are three explicit syllogisms expressed in the KCA. In each case, the First Premise describes a set whose members share particular properties/characteristics. In each Case, the Second Premise describes one particular alleged member of the set. So this alleged member is either included or excluded in the set as described in the First Premise.

If the alleged member is included in the set, either it has been successfully argued/proven to be included or it has been pre-supposed as an untested assumption. In the former case the successful argument/proof must be referenced or presented (which makes the syllogism redundant), or in the latter case we have Question Begging.

If the alleged member is excluded, both the First Premise and the Conclusion must be argued/proven to be true before this alleged member can be added to the set. That makes the sylllgism unsound - because the Conclusion must be argued/proven to be true, after which the alleged member will be included in the set described in the First Premise and so the Conclusion can be validly and soundly deduced, but because the Conclusion was just argued/proven to be true, the syllogism is redundant. The argument/proof is sufficient. But in each of the three syllogisms, this argument/proof is missing. The greater problem is that with the exclusion, the argument is a non-sequitur, and thus is invalid.

Assessment #1
P1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
P2. The universe began to exist.
C3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.

#1 If P2 is already included in the set described in P1, the argument/proof must be provided to show that "the universe began to exist and has a cause of its existence.". If P2 is pre-supposed by untested assumption, to be already included in the set described in P1, C3 must also be pre-supposed as an untested assumption - that would be a case of Question-Begging. If P2 is excluded from the set described in P1 the argument is a non-sequitur - both P2 and C3 must be argued/proven as true before P2 is added to the set, afterwhich C3 can be validly deduced. So to avoid Question-Begging, the argument/proof that would qualify P2 and C3 to be included in the set. must be provided. That argument/proof is sufficient - the syllogism is not required.

#2 There are varying claims that things come into existence ex materia, ex nihilo or ex deo. So whichever of these is claimed for P2 must be the set described in P1. So if the claim in P2 is that "The universe began to exist.ex nihilo", the set described in P1 gives us "Whatever begins to exist ex nihilo has a cause of its existence". So we then need to establish that there are instances of beginning to exist ex nihilo.

Assessment #2
P2.11. An actual infinite cannot exist.
P2.12. An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
C2.13. Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.

#1 If P2.12 is already included in the set described in P2.11, the argument/proof must be provided to show that "an infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite and cannot exist.". If P2.12 is pre-supposed by untested assumption, to be already included in the set described in P2.11, C2.13 must also be pre-supposed as an untested assumption - that would be a case of Question-Begging. If P2.12 is excluded from the set described in P2.11 the argument is a non-sequitur - both P2.12 and C2.13 must be argued/proven as true before P2.12 is added to the set, afterwhich C2.13 can be validly deduced. So to avoid Question-Begging, the argument/proof that would qualify P2.12 and C2.13 to be included in the set. must be provided. That argument/proof is sufficient - the syllogism is not required.

Assessment #3
P2.21. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite.
P2.22. The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition.
C2.23. Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot be actually infinite.

#1 If P2.22 is already included in the set described in P2.21, the argument/proof must be provided to show that "the temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition and is not actually infinite". If P2.22 is pre-supposed by untested assumption, to be already included in the set described in P2.21, C2.23 must also be pre-supposed as an untested assumption - that would be a case of Question-Begging. If P2.22 is excluded from the set described in P2.21 the argument is a non-sequitur - both P2.22 and C2.23 must be argued/proven as true before P2.22 is added to the set, afterwhich C2.23 can be validly deduced. So to avoid Question-Begging, the argument/proof that would qualify P2.22 and C2.23 to be included in the set. must be provided. That argument/proof is sufficient - the syllogism is not required.

#2 This depends upon the definition of "collection". If a collection has a specific starting point, the formed collection must be finite. If a collection has no starting point (is beginningless), the formed collection must be infinite. So if P2.21 refers to a set of collections which all have a specific starting point, the beginningless collection of past events cannot be a member of the set. The argument/proof to include P2.22 as a member of the set, is missing. The syllogism is not valid.

So, if you count backward, each day that exists has a day before that and you may speculate that such a regression can't go on forever, there must have been a day before which there was no yesterday.What stops that progression? You are not looking for a First Cause but something that would stop the measurement of changes you can observe in retrospect, the days gone by.

What does a day without yesterday look like, what does it even mean?

Again, tomorrow is another day, it seems that another must follow that and even if the sun explodes we can measure a day on another world and the days go on until the end. What forces an end to time?

For most of us, there is no reason that another day will not come in the future forever, in fact, Christian theology expresses the belief that existence is eternal, God will never die, we will have everlasting life.

The beginning and the end are not separable, if time goes forward without end, it also goes backward without end. The world can end, this universe can end but as long as anything exists, time will exist and if God existed forever in the past, so did time. If God moved, time measured Him.

So, you speculate a place outside of time and space, that's heaven, but it's not a concept you can examine closely. Things happen in heaven, people are there and where there is anything, there is time and space or else heaven is being nowhere, doing nothing.

It is very difficult discussing whether existence has a beginning when your theology states that there was something before the beginning and will be something after the end. Then when you're thoroughly confused, your scriptures come up with this gem.

"Unto him be glory in the church by Christ Jesus throughout all ages, world without end. Amen."

To the specifics:

Premise 1: Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
No, matter is neither created nor destroyed, nothing begins to exist.
Premise 2: The universe began to exist.
Again, no reason to think so but even if it did, this universe may be one of millions, ours may have formed out of the remains of another as conservation of matter would suggest.
Conclusion: Therefore, the universe has a cause.
This universe may not be all that exists, even if we accepted that this universe began at some time, it only applies to this one, the First Cause for this universe could be another and if you identify the First Cause, it must have a Cause, calling it First doesn't give it immunity.

This argument has been disproven so many times in so many ways that it really should be dropped, it's a kindergarten question from a simpler past.

In order to present the unlimited space originally Elementary:

1. variety (homogeneous) сompleted - enough to postulate the presence in it of two elements with SIMPLE and COMPLEX /closed systematically manifested the essence/

2. heterogeneous completed - enough to postulate the presence in it of one more element - the Most High and Almighty God - with open exhibited systemic nature.

Not hard to imagine that even at the lowest possible deployment intangible components the nature of God - the Spirit of God - for the level of the original downwardly directed continuous deployment the material component of the essence of God, there is a curtailment of SIMPLE and COMPLEX /i.e.. their decay occurs due to blocking of origin upwardly directed constantly deploy components of their intangible essences/, as the maximum possible heterogeneous nature of God to the minimum possible number of cell uniformity (№1h) and God on the basis of the material components of the minimum possible №1 deploys heterogeneous to its essence as possible numerical element uniformity (№2H). The process of clotting №2H begins at a certain point in time God begins at the end of its deployment. Curtailment of the Spirit of God to the level of initial deployment again unfolds №1H - God's potential for transformation into a №1H in №2H and №1H in №2H limitless!

Is the Kalam Cosmological Argument a Sound Proof for God?

Definitely not. For one thing it is refuted by the B-theory of time. As long as that's a possibility, the Kalam can't be a sound argument because its conclusion could be false. Another potential problem is that its first premise (Everything that begins to exist has a cause) logically entails determinism. If our thoughts begin to exist, they have a cause, and what ever caused that has a cause since it began to exist, and what ever caused that has a cause for the same reason, and you'll end up eventually with a chain of causes that goes back to the big bang at least. Once you got that, you've basically got determinism, and free will goes out the window. If free will goes out the window, the free will defense to the problem of evil goes out the window, and also the question of whether god (or Jesus if you're a Christian) had free will, and if they don't their concepts may not even make sense. So the Kalam introduces many problems and solves none.

Well, that is plain scary - my son brought the flu home from school and since yesterday I've been feeling under the weather, to put it mildly. I hope that you and yours recover speedily.

I used to read a lot of Spinoza, I have a lot of time for his work, his character. In my university days I read him and Russel like I should be reading the Bible. I think that the thoughtful Christian can find a lot of value in Spinoza.

I'm not sure that I would agree with the implication that an acceptance of God negates or destroys that sense of mystery, but you've certainly made me think about it. Accepting God somehow adds to the mystery of the world to me.

As to bullying each other in The Religion Wars, I must say that I am beginning to wonder if that bullying, on both sides of the fence, does not hide a deep insecurity and doubt.

Is this not a terribly debilitating way of approaching some of the big questions? That you will not give your assent to such proposition before all is known? Do we not live quite comfortably with certain of our assumptions full well knowing that we may be wrong? Why should religion be different?

This acceptance of the boundaries of our knowledge is what eventually made me give up my fight and become a Catholic. Once we understand that we cannot really know much in the sense that you are using it (quite rightly), then it becomes ok to be potentially wrong, it becomes ok to accept faith as another way of knowing. I realized that not wanting to accept faith, with all its perceived uncertainty, made me accept just another set of uncertainties. It's quite untrue to argue, as some do, that we have these choices between a world of certainty and knowing versus a world of not knowing. There are significant limitations to what we know, all that remains is to choose our positions of knowing that we are comfortable with, with enough humility and open-mindedness.

Please note, that is just my own path, I am not disagreeing with the validity of your "conservative epistemology " for you at all.

I find that most philosophical arguments are really undercover linguistic arguments. Equivocation of the word "know" certainly accounts for a lot of them. Using the word know in an empirical sense carries certain connotations. It usually refers to a datum or a mathematical or logical (formal) statement.

However, there are other human usages of the word "know." Such as, "I know John, he is my friend", or a very learned professor is said to "know" his subject matter, be it physics or theology, etc. These are factual statements, though they are not verified in the same way that 2+2=4 is verified.

I have noticed that, when arguing, it is best to discern what meaning a person is attaching to a word and just go along with it. It is much easier than disabusing them of a word's meaning or convincing them that a word has different meanings or degrees of meaning. I have also noticed that poor arguers will switch back and forth between different equivocations of a word in the same argument. That argument gets you nowhere.

Even oceans, as big as they are, are contained within the shores of the continents and the basins in which they sit. We theorize that our own universe will one day dissipate into photons and cease to exist because it is not contained in anything like the oceans. Won't the multiverse have the same problem? And if so, would it not be impossible for us to see the multiverse as it is now because it has already had an infinite amount of time to dissipate? St. Thomas stated flatly that it is impossible to pass through an infinity to arrive at any point, and I thought at the time he was confusing space and time. I now think that the transient nature of the universe (or the multiverse) really does make it impossible for infinity to exist inside of the physical world. It is this fact that I believe necessitates a non-physical creator of all that is physical.