I don't understand your question. Please explain.

what are you saying?

"But, the two are irrelevant to each other since the former specifies the modality of x's existence, whereas the latter specifies the probability of x's existence."

A distinctionless difference.

Every modal claim of necessity specifies a probability of 1. Every modal claim of impossibility specifies a probability of 0. Conversely, every nonzero probability claim entails a modal possibility claim.

This isn't some speculative claim of abstruse metaphysics where "it all depends on your philosophical assumptions". It is just a cast-iron point of logic.

If it is true that Barack Obama is a Muslim Atheist Commu-Nazi in all possible worlds, you should update your probability that he is one in this world to unity.

I'm no good with lengthy back and forths, so I'll just have to thank you for taking the time to reply and give this another shot.

You give a number of objections, so I'll try to deal with those which seem most pertinent to my argument.

One goes something like this: if I clarify my use of 'cause', I will either mean efficient cause, or any of the traditional four causes. If I mean efficient cause, then...you called it. If I mean any of the traditional four causes, then everything counts as a cause. Since I clearly reject the latter result, I must mean efficient cause.

So the worst case scenario here is that I've just meant efficient cause, not that my argument is unsound.

Another one seems to be that I'm switching back and forth between these meanings of 'cause', and this invalidates my argument.

But, suppose I was equivocating. That doesn't mean the argument needs to be equivocal. It's really no trouble to just run the argument on 'efficient cause'. So the worst case scenario here is that a weak version of my argument is unsound and we fix it.

Finally, as a reductio of my argument, you suggest that the hypothesis 'x exists necessarily' entails that x exists whereas the hypothesis that 'x probably exists' does not. And indeed, it does. But, the two are irrelevant to each other since the former specifies the modality of x's existence, whereas the latter specifies the probability of x's existence.

The proper comparison would be between two modal hypotheses: 'x exists necessarily' and 'x exists contingently'. But, both entail that x actually exists (albeit differing on x's existence in other possible worlds), thus setting the odds at unity. So, the initial 'reductio' attempt commits a category error, and its proper reformulation is not an objection to my argument.

Obviously, there's a lot more to say and I didn't address all of your responses. Maybe we'll end up hashing this out in the future, and I'll of course read if you choose to respond. In the mean time, hope to see you around.

"I don't understand how your summary of our comments can be sincere."

Well, I don't understand how Brandon lets accusations like this stand unedited, so I guess confusion abounds.

"[H]ow on earth do we get 'I don't understand what you mean by "X". Here are some options that seem reasonable in other contexts, but none of them seem to help your argument so don't want to attribute any of them to you until you clarify.' from that?"

I likewise don't understand how one could fail to understand. I pointed out (and you have never disagreed) that there are many different definitions of the term. Then I asked which, if any, definition you had in mind. Several other people seem to have had no trouble whatsoever understanding the dialectic here. I highly doubt you'll be able to find anyone, even someone who strongly accepts the PSR and thinks they have a very clear definition of explanation, who will tell you they read my first post and had no idea I was criticizing your argument for vagueness and ambiguity, or that such criticisms are generally understood to be exhortations to clarity.

"In any case, yes, I would insist that there are other explanations for the watch. Recall, as stated in the Post, that 'x has an explanation of its existence' is the abbreviated form of 'x has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.'"

Suppose I tell you that X has a schmargle. Naturally, you might want to know what it means to have a schmargle, so you can evaluate whether I am correct or incorrect in my belief.

Would you perhaps become a bit impatient if I replied, "a 'schmargle' is simply shorthand for a 'schmargle either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause'"? Are you familiar with circular definitions, and why they are problematic?

"I reiterated this in my first reply to you: 'my argument is that no matter "x" refers to, there is a true answer to this question: x exists because it was caused to, or because it's incapable of not existing.'"

No, that was your conclusion, not your argument.

By their own nature, watches are good for keeping time. "Because they're good for keeping time" has the form of (one definition of) an explanation. Therefore, even given the complete absence of (say) an efficient causal explanation, it clears the threshold of the PSR ("if anything exists, it has an explanation of its existence"). Therefore, my (correct) prediction that you would still object to it tells me you had some more specific definition in mind than the version as stated.

Let's call this new principle, the one you now argue for, PS(EC)R. "For every observation, our most parsimonious empirical model with the broadest predictive scope + inputs of the prior state entail (logically or probabilistically) the observation."

One very big problem is that I already suggested this definition, and you very very explicitly told me my list of candidates had "never been used in arguments for PSR". [emphasis supplied.] So you can see how someone might be confused by your presentation.

Another problem is we're still unclear as to whether this is the only kind of reason or explanation that "must" be present for every event.

"So, I defined an explanation as an answer to a question, and stated the question as whether 'x' has an explanation of its existence."

Check those quantifiers. The preferred formal interpretation of "answer to 'a' question" logically reads as "there is at least one question answered". If you had meant to use the definite article, you should have either said "the" or put a colon or a comma followed by "namely,".

"Our focus is then on which of two answers is true: does 'x' exist necessarily, or was it caused to exist?"

Or neither. Because we don't want to beg the question, do we?

Now, by "caused" you either mean the ordinary English sense of efficient cause (even though you say defenders of PSR "never" use this definition), or you mean the vague Scholastic aetia which sort of means "cause" but is conceptually smeared out across "explanation" and other concepts in the general neighborhood. My working hypothesis is that you are hopping back and forth from one foot to the other on this.

And if you use "cause" to mean this smeared-out notion for which form, matter, purpose etc. all count as causes, then my watch example perfectly satisfies your condition that they be "caused". But as my model predicted, you did not accept this example because you intuitively want to argue for the Efficient sense, protestations notwithstanding. As long as you use equivocal terms in your premises, your conclusion will remain equivocal and its logic invalid. So you can understand why people reserve the right to remain unconvinced.

[Here is a free parting gift to reward people who made it to the end of this post: if it is valid to argue that everything probably has an explanation because for all X it is "made more likely on the hypothesis that it has an explanation", then a fortiori every event or object we've ever observed or will observe probably "exists necessarily", since logical necessity sets the odds at unity and therefore by definition "beats" any "merely probabilistic explanation". {Extra Credit Homework: why are skeptics deeply suspicious about locutions like "probably necessary" in modal apologetics?}]

Try Gerald Kerkut ...

Hi Bob,
I hope i didn't offend you. Perhaps i don't understand enough. my impression was that you were simply pointing out that this article isn't not "proof" or "evidence" because it cannot be tested and therefore used as evidence. science is using physics, math etc. with testible evidence. but a lot of what is tested originates in what appears to be resonable, or logical. if we were to disregard that which seems reasonable or logical from the beginning we would never get to the point that we could test it. in that sense i think Steve's article passes the litmiss test even though it can't be "tested" because his line of reasoning is coherent and logical. sorry if i seemed to vague.

Pick any study you want.

You really expect me to reply to a quote from Harun Yahya the famous Islamic creationist ? You must be joking.

Go and read one of Richard Dawkin's books on evolution and we can talk after you actually know something.