Morality is the act of judging human actions. Judging requires a judge, a judge is a subject, the act of a subject is subjective. If there were a god, and if that god had a moral code for humanity, and if that god were capable of communicating its moral code unambiguously to humanity, and if that moral code provided clear guidance for every possible human act, that code would be subjective, with god as the subject.

Where might you disagree? Do you have another definition of morality? I trust we agree that morality is about humans — we don't apply morality to non-human animals. I hope we agree that morality is about acts, not thoughts or immutable biological traits. The focus on "goodness" and "badness" demonstrates we're talking about judgments. I don't see a point of contention about the definition.

The claim that some "bads" are in a class as distinct and rigorous as logic or mathematics is unsupportable, which was demonstrated when the single proposed member of that class (agony) was summarily dismissed by the only other participant in the debate. The argument is that there are identifiable members of the Objectively Moral class, as enumerable as the positive integers and irrefutable as 2+2=4. All of humanity, one has to assume, would agree to the badness/goodness ratings of this class. Yet the author could name only one item, which is single interlocutor disagreed with. The author then retreats to a generic and enormous "bad" that's a "fundamental disvalue"

This whole discussion rings of people attempting to find meaning in an irrational concept, and then debating whether or not to attribute this irrational concept to a fictional being. What a phenomenal waste of time.

Sorry for the delay Steven. Let me respond and I'll give you the last word.

I'm familiar with the de re/de dicto distinction but I'm not sure how much it will help your case.

Let's leave aside the proposition 'agony is intrinsically bad' (as the claim is most certainly false; there are plenty of good reasons to think that it's not the case that agony is intrinsically bad). Consider this rough outline instead, which I think is your argument.

P1. "It is the case that in every possible world where 'x' exists, it necessarily has property 'y'."

P2. Furthermore, where 'x' is a moral proposition it necessarily has property 'y' in every possible world where it exists

P3. 'x' exists in this world

C. Therefore, 'x' necessarily has property 'y' in this world.

Your argument (assuming I have represented you fairly) is pretty convincing to me. It does seem (again, assuming the argument is right) then that objective morality does exist in some possible worlds. However, I am not convinced that (as you suggest) objective moral truths are like logical truths, as logical truths necessarily exist in *every* possible world, i.e., there is no possible world in which logical do not exist.

To conclude: my view is that even if I weren't a Christian I would still think that moral truths are objective (at least in this possible world), however, I wouldn't think they are like logical truths. However, since *I am* a Christian I do think that moral truths are like logical ones since I think objective morality is rooted in God's ontology, and I think God necessarily exists in every possible world.

Thanks for your argument (and to Joe as well). A few things:

The question of what "founds" morality is a red herring. If I read you correctly, you are saying "Why can't morality be foundational, thus needing nothing deeper upon which to rest? If God can be foundational, why not morality? To say that God doesn't need a foundation but morality does is special pleading."

Let's grant this, and affirm "Morality is foundational, resting on nothing." 'Objective morality' is equivalent to the transcendental 'good,' so to say 'Objective morality is foundational' is to say 'good is foundational,' and also to say 'the transcendentals (truth, good, beauty) are foundational.'

So the transcendentals are foundational. In a certain way, this seems so obvious as to be banal; after all, they are transcendentals in that they ARE being (being = truth, being = good, being = beauty, etc.).

But if this is the case, then the question of whether objective morality is foundational or founded becomes irrelevant, because 'God' = being itself subsisting, and thus also truth, good, beauty. What I mean is that it very well may be that morality is foundational and rests on nothing deeper; but if "objective morality" is nothing other than the transcendental 'good,' and God is Being and for that reason all of the transcendentals, you still end up with God when you try to have only objective morality (because God = Good, just as God = Truth, or God = Beauty).

The debate, then, cannot be resolved by saying "Morality needs no foundation, because morality is foundational," as (a) this is equivalent to saying "Good needs no foundation, because good is foundational," and (b) God = good.

You identify the actual heart of the debate when you mention the Third Way (and by extension, the other ways). You are correct in saying that the Third Way does not prove God in the Biblical sense, but rather a Necessary Being. But Necessary Being = Being as such, and Being as such = good, and thus (foundation-less) morality.

The whole debate between yourself and Joe turns on whether the Necessary Being is God (in the sense of a Person, not only a Cause). If the Necessary Being is God, then to talk about objective morality is necessarily to talk about God. If the Necessary Being is not God, then your argument would hold. But in either case, the "founded or foundation-less?" thing is a distraction.

But, ‘badness’ doesn’t just emphasize the pain of agony nor is it just a moral evil. In fact, moral evil is a proper subset of badness. Badness is an enormous category that we all recognize on a daily basis, which is why I’ve been stubborn in explicating this: it seems far too close to experience to need analysis. To illustrate its breadth, badness also includes natural evils. Thus, we tend to think that it’s ‘bad’ when hundreds of children drown after a natural event occurs such as a tsunami striking a village. Badness even transcends actions. We say “I had a bad day”, and “This is just a bad situation.” It is the most fundamental disvalue known to us. So, as we can see, Joe’s counter-examples are not successful. Agony is intrinsically bad, even though it’s not intrinsically morally evil. Note, in using such a broad notion of badness, my proposition is still moral as it concerns evaluative facts that relate to what we should and should not do.

In Steven's opening statement, he presented the examples of shattered bones and paper cuts. What is different about them (besides the degree of pain) that makes one more bad than the other?

Steven
"If God *is* goodness, then goodness can't be grounded in God"
-'God is goodness' doesn't necessarily mean goodness is God- a mathematical equality. I may mean goodness inherent of God,
thus, goodness transcends from God. Hence, (all) goodness- including objective moral truths, can be grounded in God( from a theist perspective). It does not only rest(end) itself being foundational or fundamental even within a scope of an "embedded' moral strata, since human reason(being good) assists and demands 'us' to search the "whys" behind the core of this universal moral truth...and end up pointing to the Ultimate Cause.
-I think this, for me(Its totality) is foundational.
-my insight, my thanks:))

Thanks for the points Tim.

I've avoided talking about whether moral properties are natural or non-natural because that does not seem to affect whether agony is intrinsically bad.

Suppose that Ethical Naturalism is true. Then, I'd say the badness of agony is constituted by the pain involved in agony. On the other hand, if moral properties are not natural, I'd just say that agony exemplifies the non-natural property of badness in every possible world.

As to the proposition 'agony is intrinsically bad', I do maintain that it's necessarily true. Philosophers distinguish between two kinds of necessity: de re, and de dicto. To say that something is necessary de dicto is to say that it exists, or is true in every single possible world. To say that something is necessary de re is to say that it has some property in every possible world in which it exists. Thus, that I have a mind is necessary de re (for without one, I can't exist), but not de dicto (because there are innumerable possible worlds in which I fail to exist).

So, I don't mean that the proposition 'agony is intrinsically bad' is necessary de dicto, because there are some possible worlds without any agony. However, I do believe that it is necessary de re: in every possible world in which there is agony, agony is in and of itself a bad thing.

At some points, it looks like you are mixing metaphysical questions with epistemological ones. It looks like you are arguing that we can have *moral knowledge* independent of God (in which case I don't necessarily disagree), but you never talk about moral properties. What do you consider are the status of moral properties? For example, if you're a moral naturalist, then you might think goodness is identical to a natural property. It does look like you try to make a meta-ethical claim when you say that 'it is necessarily true that agony is intrinsically evil', just like it is necessarily true the triangles have three sides. That claim, however, is most certainly false. That 'agony is intrinsically evil' is an empirical claim, and a continent truth. Can there be no possible world (in the philosophical sense of 'possible world) where agony isn't evil, just like there can be no possible world where triangles have 4 sides?

That being said, you do make a good case, pace Heumber and Wielenberg, for ethical intuitionism (and I think that ethical intuitionism is probably true as well), however I would still press you to explain what exactly you think the status of moral properties are.

Thanks for following the discussion and contributing Luke!

In regards to your first point, when I said that badness transcends actions I guess I just meant that actions are not the only things that can be bad. For example, agony is not an action, it's a sensation. Yet, it's a bad thing.

With respect to your second point, it seems to me that if God *is* goodness, then goodness can't be grounded in God. For then, God would be grounded in God. But, what if God is a trinity of persons? Would goodness be one of the persons? Two of them? All of them? Or perhaps just the nature that they share? Whatever we say, it seems to me the same problem arises: since nothing can be the ground of itself, no person of the Trinity nor the nature they'd share could be its own ground.

Finally, it doesn't seem that we can ground goodness because there's nothing more fundamental that's up to the task. My approach differs from what I take Joe's to be in at least that mine involves no circularity where as it is deeply circular to say God is the ground of himself.

1) I was in complete agreement with this final article of until it was suggested that badness transcends action. Is the idea of a mosquito a bad one? Surely, they serve no human good and even inflict some "bads", but they contribute to a food chain. I am loath to beat the Dead Horse of agony, but someone experiencing intense pain may find good in it (an athlete "feeling the burn", a masochist, etc). Now, we can say that rape, for example, is a bad thing because it is an intended action. Something without will cannot act in a "bad" way. To paraphrase C.S. Lewis, we may find one tree to give more shade than another, but we cannot in seriousness really call the other tree bad.

2) It was also mentioned that morality cannot be based on God because God cannot be grounded upon God. I contend that God may certainly be grounded in God in the idea of the Holy Trinity.

3) Finally (and most subjectively), I'm still not sure what your "good" is based upon. Is good goodness in and of itself? If so, how is this a stronger argument than goodness being based in God who is based in God?