Comment 1 of 20

[O]ur anatomy and physiology did come from [descent from the animal world], but what about our rationality and morality? Take rationality or morality away from us, and we are indistinguishable from animals.

I understand that the Catholic teaching is that a Catholic may believe in physical evolution but must believe that the soul and reason were
not a result of evolution. So I can understand that Geert, as a former Jesuit and practicing Catholic, could not write otherwise.

But this assertion is just asserted, that we are mere animals except for rationality and morality. I disagree, on several levels.

First, there are many things that make us different from our closest cousin apes, including bipedalism and its related anatomical changes, hairlessness and the ability to sweat extensively, allowing high physical endurance including long-distance running or travel in general, less dimorphism, short, weaker arms and longer, stronger legs, weak jaw muscles (which may have contributed to the ability for our brains to grow), a huge brain, frequent birth problems due to said brain, extended childhood, weaker senses of hearing and smell, plus the significant ability for language.

Second, many animals share a degree of rationality and extensive moral behavior. Gerard might counter that these aren't valid (according to his definition of rationality and morality).

If one uses a tautological definition – that "rationality" is defined as "the mental abilities that humans do not share with other animals" then, of course, one can say that humans are the only rational creatures. But that isn't saying anything.

Similarly, if one uses a tautological definition – that "morality" is defined as "the mental considerations regarding ethics and morality that humans do not share with other animals" then, of course, one can say that humans are the only moral creatures. But that isn't saying anything either.

Here are some common definitions of morality:

Wikipedia defines Morality as (from the Latin moralitas 'manner, character, proper behavior') is the differentiation of intentions, decisions, and actions between those that are 'good' (or right) and those that are 'bad' (or wrong)." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Morality says "The term 'morality' can be used either (1) descriptively to refer to some codes of conduct put forward by (a) a society or (b) some other group, such as a religion, or (c) accepted by an individual for her own behavior or (2) normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons."

Are these similar to the definitions Gerard uses? Not really. His are partly, as above, tautological, and partly Divine Command Theory.

Comment 2 of 20

Morality is about what we owe others, our duties, and what others owe us, our rights.

Gerard seems to be using a definition related less to morality per se and more to ethics, or moral philosophy, which is about describing, organizing and recommending ideas about right and wrong behavior. Perhaps not surprising, given his profession. But while moral philosophy may be uniquely human, we share morality with our animal cousins

However, in a general way I could possibly work with this part of his definition – if moral philosophy is about what we believe we should do (duties) and what we believe others should do with respect to us (rights). But I think Gerard would demur because, it seems, he sees these duties and these rights as extant in some Platonic realm, completely independent of whether we perceive them or not, whether we believe them or not, and whether any other human(s) believe them or not.

Comment 3 of 20

Morality is unconditional. Most other rules and laws tell us what we should do in order to reach a certain goal—they are conditional, means-to-other-ends. Moral laws and rules, on the other hand, are based on absolute, universal, non-negotiable moral values, so they are un-conditional ends in themselves.

We differ here fundamentally, on a meta-ethical level. Gerard seems to be a proponent of deontology, the ethical theory that posits that morality is concerned with duties and rights (from Greek deon 'obligation, duty'). I'm not a strict utilitarian, because I believe that some actions are wrong despite a net positive outcome. But I'm not generally a fan of deontology. So we disagree at a pretty fundamental level.

We also disagree about the purpose and function of morality. How can it be said that moral laws are "unconditional ends in themselves"? This makes no sense. Laws can be descriptive -- e.g., the "law of gravity"
describes our perceptions of the effect of bodies with mass – or prescriptive -- e.g., moral laws. Prescriptive laws have the goal of motivating behavior for a given purpose; in this case, improving our lives, the lives of those around us, and our greater society.

Is Gerard saying that "being good" or "doing good" is just done for its "goodness" alone? Morality is about 'good' and 'bad' conduct with respect to ourselves and others. It is, therefore, for the benefit
of ourselves and others. The goal of morality, being good, is to benefit ourselves and others. Moral laws are instructions regarding pursuing and achieving these benefits.

Moral rules shouldn't be followed just because they are moral rules. In fact, they cannot be ends in themselves. Rules exist for a purpose – if there is no purpose, there should be no rule.

Then Gerard posits that moral laws are "based on absolute, universal, non-negotiable moral values." That's quite an assertion to make. On what basis is he making this claim? What is his evidence for this assertion? I disagree that moral values are those things or that they even can be.

I think that the Catholic church proposes that morality is part of the deity's nature and thus derives from said deity and thus is absolute and so forth – as I said above, divine command theory. But as an atheist, I counter with the Euthyphro
dilemma: "Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is
morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?"

Comment 4 of 20

Morality tells us what ought to be done—no matter what, whether we like it or not, whether we feel it or not, or whether others enforce it or not.

Morality guides us in deciding how to best act in the complex situations life presents to us daily. And often the moral action is not the pleasant one or the easy one, and should be chosen without respect to one's chance of getting caught.

But I have some issue with "whether we feel it or not," depending on how it is meant. I can agree if it means that the moral action may be one I know is right although I might not 'feel' so inclined.. But I cannot agree if it means that I am supposed to follow some "moral rule" even if my conscience tells me that it is immoral in a given situation, if I deeply 'feel' it to be wrong.

Comment 5 of 20

Animals, however, live in a world of “what is,” not of “what ought to be.” They can just follow whatever pops up in their brains.

This is completely wrong unless, as I wrote above, Gerard uses a tautological definition that first requires that morality is something only humans have, and thus concludes that non-human animals cannot therefore act morally. But when I write, I prefer to use words using their generally-accepted definitions instead of redefining them.

This is not to say that humans should not act at a different level of morality than our cousins. But it must be said of our social cousins that they possess moral drives, that is, the innate drive to act in pro-social ways, which may conflict at times with their drive to act in one's self interest—and it can be seen that they struggle with these conflicts and decide how to act. And, for the most part, they decide to act morally.

Examples of moral drives in animals:
A dog will complain and decline to cooperate if it receives a lesser treat for
the same behavior as another dog. (Equity) A vampire bat that does not
disgorge, after a successful night, to also feed the young of its less
successful neighbors will die soon because the neighbors punish lack of sharing. (Reciprocity) An entire primate troop acts less happy when one is injured. (Empathy) A chimpanzee or wolf that is randomly violent will be severely punished and, eventually, exiled. (Justice)

A successful social mammal is one that is able to learn the social rules of the group and is generally able to comply. In reality, most social animals behave mostly morally most of the time toward most members of the group. (Wildlife documentaries only show the few action-packed minutes of conflict out of days of monotonous eating and grooming and mating.)

Social species cannot become social without first having acquired moral traits. Animals have an innate drive to behave morally, that is, to act as a dog or a bat or a primate "ought" to act. There is not a division between "is" and "ought" in non-human animals and humans, but rather a division
between an "ought that is" and an "ought that ought." This gap is narrower.

Comment 6 of 20

Animals never do awful things out of meanness or cruelty, for the simple reason that they have no morality—and thus no cruelty or meanness.

If one defines morality at Gerard does above, tautologically, then animals cannot have morality because he defines it a something only humans possess.

Some of their behaviors, such as what appears to us as cruelty and inequity in strict social hierarchy in canids, actually serve group cohesion and predictability.

But some individuals are cruel; they have a mean disposition toward those in its group or may even be sociopathic. They continuously disobey moral rules. As in human societies, these individuals are shunned, lose friends and social status, are punished and eventually, if the behavior is severe, are killed or exiled.

And some animals do exhibit cruelty and torture: dolphins with porpoises, killer whales with seals. They seem oblivious to the pain they inflict when they play for extended periods with their injured and dying prey, or perhaps they enjoy their contortions.

Comment 7 of 20

But humans definitely do have the capacity of performing real atrocities.

"With or without [religion] you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion." Steven Weinberg

Yet, we will never arrange court sessions for grizzly bears that maul hikers, because they are not morally responsible for their actions.

Any bear that has attacked a human is hunted and killed. Not, of course, because of immorality but because it is more likely to attack humans again.

On the other hand, when two she-bears kill 42 children simply because they insulted the prophet Elisha by calling him "bald head," in 2 Kings 2, this was moral behavior for bears, because it is moral that children should be gruesomely mauled to death for insulting a man.

Perhaps this is a valid punishment for a violation of the fourth commandment to honor one's father and mother, which could be interpreted as one's elders in general, and Leviticus 20:9 says "Anyone who curses their father or mother is to be put to death. Because they have cursed their father or mother, their blood will be on their own head." Since Elisha didn't have enough stones handy for killing 42 children, apparently calling out the she-bears was a moral alternative. But I digress...