What some take from this, at the end of the day, is simply the invitation to keep learning.

The ancient Pyrrhonian skeptics found that they attained some tranquility when they were left to suspend judgment between two opposed but (seemingly) equally strong theses. Yet, they did not just say, "well, whatever, let's party." They kept on inquiring. (But they didn't refuse to party now and again betwixt their inquiries.)

Sounds good. Let's keep learning together then. Have a good weekend Mike.

Deutsch completely understands that philosophy will always follow along with reason on humanity’s quest for knowledge. Sometimes leading, sometimes lagging behind.

Mike, excommunicated

For a theist, most beliefs have to be treated as provisional.

A fair sounding theistic point of view superficially, and that’s fine. I get it. It’s comparable-sounding enough to a naturalistic frame of reference to provisional knowledge. I’d argue there are irreconcilable differences between the two outlooks when we scratch deeper. As I’ve tried to stress with Bonnette, someone is going one presupposition further. For natural philosophy we stop when the evidence runs out. The religious philosopher makes a further inductive claim. I don’t consider that believing responsibly. Fatima is of no use here.

One of the things that you can be absolutely sure of is that there are very few things that you can be absolutely sure of

I find this rendition awful! YMMV. The literature on this topic (pedagogy, irony, ignorance, paradox) is vast. Too much for a combox. So let’s look at it. Lol.

I neither know nor think I know. -Socrates

What some take from this, at the end of the day, is simply the invitation to keep learning. Absolute claims or justified true beliefs do form the meat of the Platonic commentary. It’s fun stuff.

I’ll just keep on learning.

Mike, excommunicated cum laude

It's a bit hard for me to parse some of that, so I'll just focus on your last paragraph.

It depends on the type of conclusions we are talking about. Justification in science has to involve data. A logically coherent and non-extravagant model that is consistent with the data is at least weakly justifiable. Stronger justification obtains to the extent that we do our best to think up alternative explanations and then rule those alternative explanations out on the basis of data.

By contrast, I don't think data are necessary or even relevant for truly metaphysical questions. Metaphysical principles are justifiable to the extent that one cannot even engage in rational thinking (and by extension, cannot engage in science) without them, and then anything that follows deductively from such metaphysical principles is (I would say) a logically justified conclusion.

For a theist, most beliefs have to be treated as provisional. That is the essence of the proscription against idolatry. To be too attached one's conceptions of God, or too attached to one's pet conceptual models of reality, or whatever, is a form of idolatry. OTOH, the proscription against idolatry is (ironically) dogmatically asserted (that is, it is asserted as being absolutely, and not just provisionally correct). The secular version of this is something like: "The only thing you can be absolutely sure of is that you can't be absolutely sure of anything." Obviously that is nonsense if taken at face value. A more nuanced and reasonable position is something like: "One of the things that you can be absolutely sure of is that there are very few things that you can be absolutely sure of".

The response that would have really surprised me, from you, would have been “probably unknown.” In truth I’m surprised you chose to reply at all. Very appreciated.

The questions for me, and ones I’m only offering for ponderance, are: 1. are there illogical realities; 2. what is meant by a justified logical position; 3. are justified logical positions telling us anything about reality.

1. By this I mean principles of reality that exist but are perceived as illogical because of possible limitations of evolutionary-shaped minds.

2. By this I mean do all justified logical positions exist as a unified whole.

3. By this I mean how does a yes compare in explanation to a no answer.

Less ponderance now and more discussion is in the question of how we come to justified logical conclusions. Are they provisional or absolute? Is there real estate for an unnamed term between an unjustified logical conclusion and a justified logical conclusion?

Mike, excommunicated

Good question!

You are correct (sorry to not surprise you): my top level answer is "no". In general, I can't see why it is illogical to posit the existence of brute facts. It therefore seems logically possible to me that particle decay times are simply brute facts, with no causal explanation. However, as a matter of disposition (and by virtue of spending a career in the sciences), I hope that there are no such things as brute facts. I hope that everything is ultimately intelligible. It seems like a perfectly reasonable hope to me, one that is not yet contradicted by any deliverance of science.

Is it your position that particle decay absent any causal antecedent is illogical? I see three top tier replies:

Yes
No
Unknown

The next tiers add the prefixes probably, possibly to each reply.

Pick the one or combination you find justifiable. Unless I’m mistaken, you’ve seemingly argued in the vein of thinking no.

Surprise me.

Mike, excommunicated

Or is this dispute about causation in particle physics instead analogous to a case where supposing F actually is incompatible with the simpler explanation of G, not merely unnecessary for it?

Excellently put. What results is trivial for physicists but profound for philosophers: pre-assigning a level of importance to the supposition of F.

This is why the phrase “shut up and calculate” exists. When that philosophical space carved out for F produces hard-to-vary explanatory evidence the world of science will stampede to that space to learn more. Until then (“until” being the non-absolutist word on point) equational parsimony reigns.

Mike

Within the blank there are no singular, determined polluting cars.

That's where your analogy falls apart. You simply have no evidence that there is nothing analogous to a "determined polluting car". There is very good evidence that that "determined polluting car" can't be mediated by any local variables, but there is no evidence against causal antecedents in general. QM is just silent on that question. That's why there are multiple interpretations of QM, including the Bohm interpretation.

This has nothing to do with what I want. I love surprises. I love things that go against my intuition. What I don't love is logically flawed reasoning.