"God is not "a thing" among other things..." Doesn't matter if he's
among other things or not, he's still a thing if he's not nothing. This
is the beginning of a bunch of special pleading.

Well said...

Glen

Thanks for the reply, Josh! Looking forward to more discussion in the future.

This was a short reply? :) Well, I have no self-imposed limits on my number of corrections, so, once more unto the breach.

"It seems to me you're confusing causal epistemology with causal ontology." Not in the least. I am pointing out that you are assuming an ontology which you can't epistemologically justify. The best available science does not indicate a cause in the traditional sense at the most fundamental level. The best available science in fact militates against such a cause through the no-hidden-variables conclusion. If you want to assert your premise the burden is on you to show how you know it is true despite this fact.

"The premise only concerns things that begin to exist, not anything that changes (e.g., decays)." Colloquially, we would say that the decay, let's say Beta decay, is the moment when the neutron ceases to exist and a new electron, proton, and neutrino begin to exist. The neutrino and electron were not previously 'inside' or 'part of' the neutron. If you are going to call this only a change then we have to conclude that we have never observed anything beginning to exist, which is fine by me but destroys your argument handily.

"Again, this is to confuse epistemology with ontology. To say, "We don't *know* when the brick began to exist as a brick" (which I'm only granting for argument's sake--I don't agree with this) is not to say, "We don't know *whether* the bricks exists." "

Again, the only one confused is you. I'm saying that based on a more sophisticated understanding of what "a brick" is we can't know because there is in fact no well defined notion of beginning and end to it. It only exists as an approximation, which is perfectly good for building houses, but not for talking about the underlying nature of reality. Like 'red' as distinct from 'orange' it is a categorical division that exists for your convenience but not 'out in reality.' This is a tricky, non-intuitive point but it is an example of why I say that your folk-definitions aren't up to the task. Yelling at me that the brick wasn't there and now it is is the equivalent of yelling that your grandfather wasn't no monkey. It misses the point.

"I appreciate this whole paragraph but I struggle to see how it's relevant to either of the two kalam premises." Then I'd say you don't appreciate it. The point is that I can equally conceptualize a beginning in space as I can a beginning in time. But the beginning in space doesn't demonstrate causal dependence on the adjacent space, so you also can't demonstrate causal dependence in time.

"But your final sentence suggests on the surface that the idea of "cause"is completely unpersuasive--that nothing really causes anything else. Is this what you believe?"

This is indeed what I am arguing. Or at least that our notions of cause and effect have to be very carefully examined and defined before you can begin to make anything like a cosmological argument.

"God is not "a thing" among other things..." Doesn't matter if he's among other things or not, he's still a thing if he's not nothing. This is the beginning of a bunch of special pleading.

"...since God (or the Uncaused Cause) is necessarily beyond space, he has no geographical component--thus using the word "anywhere", as you did, betrays a serious confusion." It's normally held that God is omnipresent so the confusion is on your part. Anyhow, 'anywhere' was a word you introduced and it relates to another mistake I'll discuss below.

"Third, God doesn't "exist"--he *is* existence. He is, as Thomas Aquinas demonstrated..." Hold your horses, Aquinas didn't demonstrate anything except the inadequacy of his metaphysics. This is just the granddaddy or all special pleading. If god doesn't exist he doesn't exist, period. "Existence itself" isn't a coherent concept, it doesn't exist independent of an actual thing existing. It most certainly does not create things, or sustain them, or have a mind or purpose, to say nothing of having a son by a palestinian woman. Existence itself does not speak to you through a burning bush and give itself a dubiously translated name. If one could argue that 'existence itself' was a needed concept separate from 'a thing existing' then we would also need a meta-existence and a meta-meta-existence, etc.

"If our physical universe had a beginning--a beginning to all space, time, matter, and energy--then the cause of that universe must be spaceless, timeless, and immaterial, by logical necessity. It must be "non-physical." "
I'm afraid not. As before, you cited cosmological evidence as evidence of the 'universe's' beginning. But the cosmological evidence supports at most the idea that the current phase of our observable universe had a beginning, not that all possible physical universes have a beginning. The Borde-Guth-Vilenkin paper, even generously interpreted to say things it doesn't say, doesn't show that the physical universe, meaning all 'natural' things had a beginning. (This gets back to your 'anywhere' equivocation, we don't know about 'all things anywhere', we know about the observable universe.)

So, when you say that all space, time and matter and energy [and anything else that you would call natural, an undefined term at this point] had a beginning I correctly say that there is no evidence for that premise. Moreover, if you can argue that the natural universe must have had an unnatural cause, then I can do you one better and argue that the unnatural universe, must have a natural cause, one which is spaceful, material, etc. by 'logical necessity'. Natural or unnatural, material or immaterial, you haven't actually set out a coherent notion of how to judge that one thing causes another.

If you define 'universe' as in your last paragraph then you beg all the important questions. What does it mean for time to 'begin to exist'? What does it mean for an immaterial thing to cause a material thing? Why define universe in terms of arbitrarily limited, vague categories like 'physical' and 'natural'? Why do you think anything needs to be 'brought into existence' and what evidence do you have that it only applies to 'natural' things? I get that you don't understand how the universe works, but every time you try to solve those riddles with 'God' you are special pleading.

I'd appreciate it if you would first note the argument I am making and not the one you are replying to that, so far as I can tell, only exists in your head. I have nowhere said that there is no objective truth or that the meaning of words can't be understood. We were discussing ideas about 'the meaning of life' and similar phrases.

Now the argument is often advanced that without God life is meaningless. Obviously most atheists believe in some idea of objective reality, although, yes, statements about that reality are always subject to skeptical doubt in principle. So clearly, people who assert that 'life has no meaning absent god' don't mean that this statement only follows given the most radical sort of skepticism. Rather, they mean something about a sense of purpose or ultimate direction or absolute morality or immortality, etc. It's an intentionally vague phrase, David Nickol above seems to take it along the lines of "Why should I care?" My point is that if one can categorically say that about an atheist universe then one is equally free to say it about a theist universe.

I agree that "God is" would be a considerable change of reality, but there are an infinite number of purely physical considerable changes to reality we could also imagine. If life is meaningless regardless of those changes then God doesn't add anything new. Neither objectively forces one to find meaning in these 'facts', even if they are objective facts.

When I say that life only has the meaning we give it, I am pointing out that meaning is an inherently subjective thing. So it is independent of whether or not God exists. For the sake of argument, I'm allowing that 'God is', but pointing out that it doesn't change my argument.

Well, first I would note that if you apply "meaning is an inherently subjective thing" to itself, the meaning of the statement is inherently subjective, and therefore meaning becomes objective. The statement is self-referentially incoherent, and can't be applied to itself without cancelling itself.

But if I do grant that meaning is totally subjective, how could you assert that your computer exists, much less God? If meaning is subjective and there is no chance of the mind discovering the objective truth about the world, only representations and impressions, you can't finally concede that "God is" (or anything is) without arguing in a circle. All is subject to skeptical doubt, as illustrated by your universe-as-computer example.

To really consider the postulate "God is," we have to believe that "is" is objective existence, not merely subjective belief. And it's clear that, taken as objective existence, "God is" alters the landscape of reality considerably - again, whether or not one believes, subjectively. (Gravity exists objectively, for example - whether or not a person believes in it, they will most certainly feel its effects leaping from their roof.)

Now, I'm already two comments past my "last comment" in this thread, so I'll let this short reply be my final one

As you keep returning to the Kalam Cosmological Argument as though it is sound, it wouldn't be honest to leave it here.

If this is not the appropriate thread, I suggest that you refer everyone (especially Josh) to a thread in which it is appropriate and finish what you started.

It would be unbearable and give the impression of dishonesty (intended or not) if you left it at this, and showed up somewhere else, having hit the reset button, acting as though this argument had any weight.

For goodness' sake, you are claiming an unsound deductive argument is sound and have yet to show that it is the case.

It's very important that you finish what you started without punting back to Aquinas or making bizarre statements like:

Also, all that's needed to arrive at the conclusion is for each of the premises to be shown more likely than their alternatives

That doesn't work.

Again, to repeat the unanswered refutation I've made several times, just because we've yet to detect a cause (which I'm only granting for the sake of argument), that does not prove that no cause exists.

This is not a refutation. Not even close. It is not up to the person addressing your deductive argument to prove that no cause exists. It is up to you to prove that a cause exists. You haven't.

just because we've yet to detect a cause (which I'm only granting for the sake of argument),

You have no choice but to grant that. We have not yet detected a cause. Unless you can show a cause, this is the case.

that does not prove that no cause exists.

You don't seem to understand the burden. This is fundamental. It doesn't have to prove that no cause exists. You have to prove that it does or you can't have your first premise.

Now, if your response to that is going to be:

The premise is "everything that begins to exist has a cause" not "everything that changes..."

then please explain the distinction.

If divorce could be used as a 'moral' factor regarding religious vs non-religious, the Barna Research Group did a survey in the late 1990's: http://www.adherents.com/largecom/baptist_divorce.html
Over-all, this link seems to be a fair and evenhanded breakdown of that study...

Glen

josh, thanks for your most recent comment! It's your best one so far.

Now, I'm already two comments past my "last comment" in this thread, so I'll let this short reply be my final one (promise!). I've really enjoyed our back-and-forth and hope we can keep it up on other posts.

Unfortunately, you've just offered way too many thoughts to offer a comprehensive reply. I wish we could sit down and discuss all of this over a beer, but alas, we don't have that opportunity. Nevertheless, in this last reply I'll respond to your most significant points, as I see them:

"There is no unknown number sitting in the atom that tells us when it will decay. So no traditional notion of cause...Our best theory of physics does not include causes."

It seems to me you're confusing causal epistemology with causal ontology. Whether we *know* about a particular cause is independent of whether that cause *exists.* Again, to repeat the unanswered refutation I've made several times, just because we've yet to detect a cause (which I'm only granting for the sake of argument), that does not prove that no cause exists.

Even understanding that fact, however, you've still yet to provide proof of anything *beginning to exist* without cause. You keep returning to the decay example, but as I've repeatedly noted, this is irrelevant to the first premise of the kalam argument. The premise only concerns things that begin to exist, not anything that changes (e.g., decays).

"Similarly, the notion of 'beginning to exist' is not clear in modern physics. Consider a color spectrum. 'Orange' does not begin to exist at a definite point when 'yellow' and 'red' stop existing."

But colors are not "things", they are abstract descriptions. They are useful fictions that neither begin to exist or stop existing. Saying that "orange" does not begin to exist is like saying "tallness" does not begin to exist. The first premise in the kalam argument is not falsified by either of these abstract categories since it only concerns concrete "things".

"Fundamentally, the brick is a local feature of a continuous whole and it does not have a beginning or end except as an approximation."

Again, this is to confuse epistemology with ontology. To say, "We don't *know* when the brick began to exist as a brick" (which I'm only granting for argument's sake--I don't agree with this) is not to say, "We don't know *whether* then bricks exists." I would like to think that if I held up a brick to you and asked, "Does this brick exist?" you would agree it does. And I'd also like to think that if we traveled back five-thousand years ago, before any brick buildings existed in what is now America, you would agree the brick did not exist as a brick. Therefore, at some point the brick began to exist--even if we have difficult determining when that was.

"Or consider, does the 'first' square inch of my desk cause the adjacent ones? No. It may be that one implies the other but that doesn't make it ontologically prior."

I appreciate this whole paragraph but I struggle to see how it's irrelevant to either of the two kalam premises. The first premise, remember, is that "whatever begins to exist has a cause." Not "whatever is adjacent has a cause."

"But I will warn you now, I can always formulate a shift in perspective that will make your view just another example of a description without a need for ontological priority. The fact that I can do that rather disposes of your ability to use your notion of cause in any persuasive argument."

I'll admit, this paragraph isn't at all clear to me. I'm afraid I'd need more comments and questions to unpack this. But your final sentence suggests on the surface that the idea of "cause" is completely unpersuasive--that nothing really causes anything else. Is this what you believe?

"Note that your equivocations are confusing even yourself now: 'By "universe" I mean everything that exists anywhere.' Except that you want to argue that god doesn't have a beginning, so god can't be in your universe, so your universe isn't everything that exists anywhere."

This is not equivocation. It's a confusion on your end. You're right that God doesn't have a beginning, and that he is not in the universe. Your conclusion doesn't follow from those two facts, however. First, God is not "a thing" among other things--this is not only what Christians believe but it is what necessarily follows from the cosmological arguments. Second, since God (or the Uncaused Cause) is necessarily beyond space, he has no geographical component--thus using the word "anywhere", as you did, betrays a serious confusion. Third, God doesn't "exist"--he *is* existence. He is, as Thomas Aquinas demonstrated, ipsum esse subsistens: the sheer act of 'to be' itself (this is why God only refers to himself as I AM). For more on why God does not exist but *is* pure existence (or pure actuality in Aristotliean language, I suggest Aquinas' short treatise, "On Being and Essence."

"As I said, physical observations might suggest that our current universe had a beginning in some sense, but you can't get from there to a non-physical thing."

You can, and I've repeatedly done so. If our physical universe had a beginning--a beginning to all space, time, matter, and energy--then the cause of that universe must be spaceless, timeless, and immaterial, by logical necessity. It must be "non-physical."

"If we accept the kalam premises we aren't lead to your desired conclusions. The most likely 'cause' for our universe would be a larger notion of the natural universe."

Your second sentence is telling as it reveals how we're operating with different definitions of "universe." When I say "the universe began to exist", I'm including in the word "universe" all natural, physical things that exist anywhere. Therefore, by definition, a "larger notion of the natural universe" could not have caused the universe" (if we agree that something cannot bring itself into existence) since the universe contains *all* natural things.

Of course you would, you would just think you can add 'but he was actually mistaken.' But, as I said, being in a theist world can't actually put meanings "out there".